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In United States v Morrison,' the Supreme Court held that Congress

lacks the power under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a provision of the Violence
Against Women Act creating a civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence.2 Morrison is but one of a recent string of
cases in which the Court has attempted to delineate judicially enforceable limits on Congress's authority to legislate in furtherance
of the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.3
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1120 S Ct 1740 (2000).
2 Pub L No 103-322, Tit IV, § 40302, 108 Stat 1941-1042 (1994) (codified at 42 USC
§ 13981 (Supp V 1998)).
3 See Kimel v Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S Ct 631 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked
power under Section 5 to abrogate state sovereign immunity for suits under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 USC §§ 621-34 (1994 & Supp IV 1998)); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v College Savings Bank, 527 US 621 (2000) (same, for suits
under Patent Remedy Act, 35 USC §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994)), City of Boerne v Flores, 521
US 507 (1997) (striking down Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub L No 103-141, 107
Stat 1488 (codified at 42 USC § 2000bb (1994)) as beyond the scope of Congress's Section
5 power).
Several commentators have argued that the federal balance is best protected by the politi© 2001 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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These cases appear at first glance to depart from the spirit, if not
the letter, of relevant precedent; indeed, last Term marks the first
time since Reconstruction that the Court has held that antidiscrimination laws fall outside of the reach of Congress's Section 5
authority.
The Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence has met with both
confusion and consternation in the legal academy. In particular,
several commentators have faulted the Court for what they see as
its unduly crabbed understanding of Congress's ability-and authority-to act as a partner to the courts in giving meaning to
constitutional guarantees. 4 While we agree with much of what has
been written on the subject, we believe that a closer look at the
cases leading up to Morrison reveals that they are, in the main,
justifiable. Morrison is troubling precisely because it cannot be
squared with the reasoning of these earlier cases. In order to understand what is wrong about Morrison and right about the cases
that preceded it, a clear understanding of Congress's Section 5
power is called for. Much rides on the Court's willingness to reexamine some of the aspects of its decision in Morrison, lest illfounded concerns regarding the balance of power both between
Congress and the courts and between the federal government and
the states result in a narrowing of the scope of federal antidiscrimination law, and in the capacity of the national government to address problems of inequality.'
cal processes, and that the judiciary need not (and should not) play a role in policing its
bounds. See, e.g., Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and National PoliticalProcess (1980); Larry
D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum L
Rev 215 (2000); Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 Vand L Rev 1485 (1994); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguardsof Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 543 (1954). The current Court,
however, seems intent on finding some judicially enforceable limits on Congress's power.
Accordingly, as good limits are better than bad ones, we proceed on the assumption that
such limits do indeed exist, and attempt to explain where they should lie.
' See, e.g., David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Supreme Court Review 31, 59-71; Douglas
Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev 743, 763-67
(1998); Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 111 Harv L Rev 153, 169-74, 184-89 (1997); Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: FederalAntidiscrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110
Yale L J 441, 509-22 (forthcoming 2000).
1The Section 5 question has taken on added importance in recent years due to the
Court's apparent willingness to impose nontrivial limits on Congress's authority to regulate
commerce, confining the permissible reach of commerce-based enactments to regulation
of "economic," as opposed to social, conduct. See Morrison, 120 S Ct at 1750-52; United
States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 567 (1995). Since the Justices' famous 1937 "switch in time
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The debate over Congress's enforcement power under Section
5 has been clouded by two fundamental misconceptions of the nature of that power. The first source of confusion stems from the
Fourteenth Amendment's peculiar structure, which invests Congress and the courts with complementary authority to see that its
substantive provisions are enforced against the states. It is widely
understood that the power of the courts to "enforce" the provisions of the Constitution necessarily embraces the power to interpret those provisions. Accordingly, the judicial act of enforcement
is inextricably linked to the power of the courts to "say what the
law is." 6 Section 5 thus seems to pose a constitutional conundrum.
On the one hand, Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment could be understood to mirror that of the courts.
Congress, on this view, enjoys broad authority independently and
authoritatively to interpret the meaning of the constitutional provisions it "enforces." Such definitional authority, however, seems
to violate well-settled principles of separation of powers, and indeed to call into question the supremacy of the Constitution, for
if Congress can alter constitutional meaning through ordinary legislation, then "[sihifting legislative majorities could change the
Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed
amendment process contained in Article V."7
Separation of powers concerns, therefore, might lead us to give
that saved nine," which heralded a willingness to give expansive readings to congressional
authority, especially under the Commerce Clause, it commonly had been thought that the
reach of federal authority was essentially a "political" question. Congress could be expected,
under this view, to intrude on state interests no more than necessary to address national
problems, because the very structure of the national government provided ample safeguards
for the states. As long as the Court was prepared to view congressional authority in these
terms, the precise reach of Congress's Section 5 power was not a matter of great practical
urgency. Thus, the civil rights laws enacted in the 1960s-which one would have thought
were the natural province of Section 5 power-were sustained by the Court as instances
of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. See Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US
294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v United States, 379 US 241 (1964). Even though these
laws were principally about equality rather than commerce, interstate commerce was found
implicated, for example, in every workplace having fifteen or more employees. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Tit VII, 42 USC § 2000e(b) (1994). Section 5 authority was, of course,
in the background in these cases, but both Congress and the Court found it unnecessary
to reach that issue given the capacious reading the Justices were prepared to accord to
Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce. The Court's recent cases limiting
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause suggest that antidiscrimination legislation
can no longer rest comfortably on the commerce power, bringing to the fore the reach of
its authority under Section 5.
'Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
7City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 529 (1997).
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a much more limited scope to Congress's Section 5 enforcement
power. On this view, the courts' interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment would mark both the floor and the ceiling of constitutional protections; Congress may neither restrict those protections
nor enhance them. Its authority to enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment would include only the power to codify
the courts' constitutional holdings. Congress's contribution to the
scheme of constitutional protection would lie in its ability to fashion complex or wide-reaching remedies for those constitutional violations identified by the courts in particular cases.
This narrow understanding of Congress's Section 5 power still
seems unsatisfactory, however, because it denies Congress any independent role in determining "whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 8
For this reason, the Court consistently has stated that Congress's
Section 5 power is not restricted to legislating against those state
actions a court would find unconstitutional if asked. 9
Here we find ourselves at an apparent impasse: Either Congress
can interpret the Constitution in the same way courts do, or Congress never can engage in any independent interpretation. The former solution gives Congress too much interpretive authority; the
latter too little. But this is a false conflict if we understand that
whatever "interpretation" inheres in Section 5 legislation is in no
sense a species of constitutional adjudication, and in no sense derogates from judicial supremacy over the meaning of the Constitution. There is a difference between what, for example, the Equal
Protection Clause requires of its own force and thus is a matter
of self-enforcement by the courts, and what sort of legislation
might be "appropriate" to ensure full practical enjoyment of the
constitutional values that inhere in the Equal Protection Clause,
Katzenbacb v Morgan, 384 US 641, 651 (1966).
9See, e.g., United States v Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740, 1755 (2000) (stating that Congress's
Section 5 power includes authority to "'prohibit conduct which is not itself unconstitutional"' (quoting Boerne, 521 US at 518)); Kimel v Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S Ct 631, 644
(2000) (noting that Congress's power to enforce Fourteenth Amendment includes authority
to remedy and prevent constitutional violations by prohibiting conduct that "is not itself
forbidden by the Amendment's text"); Morgan, 384 US at 648 ("A construction of § 5 that
would require a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state law precluded by
Congress would violate the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional
enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment.").
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as interpreted by the courts. Once we recognize that statutorily
enhancing a constitutional guarantee is not the same thing as
changing it, the institutional conflict suggested by the Fourteenth
Amendment's grant of concurrent authority to enforce its substantive provisions dissolves from view. It is possible, therefore, to respect separation of powers while according Congress an important
role in giving practical meaning to constitutional guarantees.
Section 5 is perplexing, not only because of separation of powers
concerns, but also because the potential sweep of congressional
authority threatens to upset the federal balance. As a general matter, Section 5 should raise no more federalism concerns than any
other of Congress's enumerated powers. Any legislation-whether
based on Section 5 or Article I-will result in an expansion of the
federal power and a corresponding restriction of that of the
states.' ° In one sense, however, Section 5 is different. In Fitzpatrick
v Bitzer,1' the Court held that Congress may abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit when it exercises its
Section 5 enforcement power. Then, in Seminole Tribe v Florida,12
the Court made clear that Section 5 is the only basis for such authority: Congress cannot subject nonconsenting states to suit under the Commerce Clause, for example.13
The rationale of Fitzpatrick was reasonably straightforward.
Given that the Fourteenth Amendment constitutes an explicit
expansion of the powers of the federal government and a consequent diminution of state sovereignty, 14 Congress's power to
legislate pursuant to Section 5 could not readily be limited by

11It has been suggested that because the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment protects all "life, liberty [and] property," US Const, Amend IV, § 1, Congress's Section 5 power, if not properly limited, could overtake the states entirely, rendering them
mere instrumentalities of congressional will. But Congress's Section 5 power is not unlimited, for, as we demonstrate below, Congress can act only in areas of heightened constitutional concern, as identified by the Court either in advance of or subsequent to legislation.
See Parts I.B, III.B.
11427 US 445 (1976).
12 517 US 44 (1996).
" Id at 63-73 (holding that Congress lacks power under Article I to subject nonconsenting states to suit in federal court). See also Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999) (extending
Seminole Tribe's sovereign immunity bar to suits brought against states in their own courts).
14See Fitzpatrick, 427 US at 456 ("When Congress acts pursuant to Section 5, not only
is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional
grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional amendment whose
other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.").
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the principles of sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment.15 The Court's recent Section 5 cases demonstrate,
however, that what the Court giveth, the Court taketh away. Because the Court has vested Congress with more power to restrict
state sovereignty-by abrogating sovereign immunity-under Section 5 than under Article I, it now seems prepared to subject Section 5-based legislation to more searching scrutiny in order to
protect against congressional overreaching.
The Eleventh Amendment question does raise the practical
stakes, and the Court is right to insist that particular legislation
represent an appropriate exercise of Section 5 power. But concern
over the states' immunity from suit should not drive the Section
5 inquiry. Congress's role in enforcing Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees, when appropriately exercised, works "no invasion of
state sovereignty"' 6 because that sovereignty is limited by the
amendment. The central task, therefore, should be to work out
appropriate ground rules for Section 5 authority that give full effect to the design of the Framers, rather than hobble the capacity
of the national legislature in order to shield the states from suit.
In this article, we argue that Congress's power to legislate pursuant to Section 5 should be analyzed, like legislation enacted under
Article I, under the deferential necessary and proper standard. In
accordance with that standard, Congress should be accorded substantial deference both in its identification of valid ends of national
legislation and in its choice of the means by which to achieve its
goals. Section 5, properly understood, raises no more separation
of powers concerns than any other grant of power to Congress.
Any limits on Congress's Section 5 power, therefore, should stem,
not from an artificial distinction between legislation that is "substantive" in effect and that which enforces (but does not purport
to change) the constitutional guarantees in question, but from a
theory of the appropriate objects of Section 5 legislation.
We argue that Congress acts within its Section 5 power when
it seeks to ensure full enjoyment of constitutional rights the Court
"5
See id at 454-56. See also Alden, 119 S Ct at 2267 ("[]n adopting the Fourteenth
Amendment, the people required the states to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that
had been preserved for them by the original Constitution, so Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its § 5 enforcement power.").
6Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US 339, 346 (1879).
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has identified (or is prepared to identify). Thus, Congress is not
limited to codifying the Court's constitutional decisions, but can
legislate within the areas of constitutional concern the Court has
marked out. That is, the Court's interpretations of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provide the starting point for Section 5based legislation; Congress can create statutory rights beyond what
the Constitution requires of its own force when it finds such extraconstitutional protections to be necessary in order to effectuate the
more general constitutional values recognized by the Court.
In Part I.A, we discuss the Court's early explications of the Section 5 power in Katzenbach v Morgan"7 and the cases that followed
it. Morgan, we explain, has spawned a great deal of confusion in
that it can be taken to imply that Congress has power under Section 5 to alter the meaning of the constitutional provisions it enforces. The question raised in Morgan regarding whether Section 5
accords Congress a definitional role with respect to constitutional
meaning was answered definitively in the negative in the Supreme
Court's recent decision in City of Boerne v Flores.'8 In Part I.B, we
discuss the Boerne decision, and argue that, while the Boerne Court
was correct to identify a separation of powers problem with the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 9 the problem was more limited than the Court suggested. We then turn to the congruence
and proportionality test introduced in Boerne, and explain how the
test was used (until Morrison) to identify and assess the ends of
Section 5-based legislation, rather than question the means Congress employs in the service of objectives properly within the scope
of its Section 5 authority.
In Part II, we address the Court's decision in Morrison, which,
we argue, was marred by two crucial errors. First, the Court misunderstood the state action limitation in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment; second, the Court misapplied the congruence
and proportionality test, transforming it from a tool to divine
whether Congress's objectives were constitutionally proper into a
limitation on the means Congress permissibly may adopt to
achieve otherwise valid legislative ends. Finally, in Part III, we
apply our proposed framework to the Americans with Disabilities
17384 US 641 (1966).

18521 US 507 (1997).
"Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 USC § 2000bb (1994)).
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Act ° so as to illustrate the role of Section 5 as a basis for federal
antidiscrimination legislation to enforce values the Court has identified under Section 1.
I.

THE MYSTIQUE OF SECTION

5

The Fourteenth Amendment is something of a constitutional anomaly. Like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits certain governmental incursions on individual rights; these prohibitions are selfexecuting and enforceable by the courts. However, the Fourteenth
Amendment does more than guarantee citizens a set of negative
rights against the government. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment-like the Thirteenth and Fifteenth-contains an affirmative
grant of power to Congress to enforce its prohibitions.2' It envisions an important role for the federal government in giving full
effect to the rights it guarantees. Given our tendency to think of
the Court as the primary protector of individual rights, it is easy
to forget that the main purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments was to enlarge the power of Congress.22 Although the drafters of the amendments were careful to ensure that the judiciary
would have the power to compel adherence to the self-enforcing
provisions of these amendments,2 3 they believed that federal legislation pursuant to the amendments' enforcement provisions was
'2 4
necessary in order to make them "fully effective.
Section 5's grant of power to Congress to "enforce, by appropriate legislation," the Fourteenth Amendment raises deep and
puzzling questions regarding the proper role of Congress in interpreting and effectuating constitutional guarantees. Although Congress has broad enforcement power under Article I-power that,
unconstrained, could reach countless facets of daily life-the potential sweep of congressional authority under the Fourteenth
2042 USC § 12101 et seq (1994 & Supp IV 1998).
21US Const, Amend XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
22E& Parte Virginia, 100 US at 345 ("It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged."). See also text accompanying notes 28-29.
21See notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
24
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US at 345.
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Amendment is nothing short of breathtaking." Section 5 thus requires us to think seriously about how meaningfully to confine
congressional power under Section 5 while remaining faithful to
the structure of the amendment, which unquestionably means to
enlist the power of the federal government in ensuring that its
guarantees of liberty and equality enjoy full practical effect.
KATZENBACH V MORGAN'S TWO RATIONALES

A.

What, then, does it mean for Congress to "enforce" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment? The Court first addressed
this question in Ex Parte Virginia,26 in which it upheld a statute
prohibiting state officials from excluding citizens from jury service
on account of their race.27 Emphasizing that the Reconstruction
Amendments "were intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the power of the states and enlargements of the power of
Congress," 28 the Court explained that Section 5 vests Congress
with expansive authority to give effect to the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry
out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends
to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to
secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial
or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power.29
As this language suggests, Congress would seem to enjoy the
same broad power under Section 5 as under the Necessary and

25See, e.g., Cole at 54-55 (cited in note 4) (noting that, because most provisions of Bill
of Rights have been incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process,
Congress's Section 5 authority conceivably could support legislation imposing additional
warrant requirements to enforce Fourth Amendment, requiring provision of legal counsel
in all interrogatories pursuant to Fifth Amendment, or prohibiting the regulation of obscenity under First Amendment).
26 100 US 339 (1879).
27
Act of March 1, 1875, ch 114, § 4, 18 Stat 336 (codified as amended at 18 USC § 243
(1994)).
28Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US at 345.
29

Id at 345 -46.
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Proper Clause of Article V'30 Under the standard set forth by Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v Maryland,3 Congress traditionally
is accorded substantial discretion in choosing the means by which
to pursue permissible legislative goals: "Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the con'32
stitution, are constitutional."
The lesson of McCulloch is not limited, however, to deference
to congressional choice of means. Marshall's famous admonition
that "it is a constitution we are expounding"33 did not, as is commonly assumed, speak to the authority of the judiciary to read
meaning into the Constitution's vague pronouncements. Rather,
in the context of McCulloch (which, after all, upheld the constitutionality of legislation creating the Bank of the United States),
those words counseled judicial deference to Congress's rational
identification of legitimate legislative ends. The Constitution is
painted in broad strokes, Marshall reminds us, and within the
rough outline the document itself provides, Congress should be
accorded wide discretion in identifying the need for federal legislation and the appropriate means to effectuate constitutional
guarantees.
The Court affirmed this reading in Katzenbach v Morgan.34 Explicitly linking congressional authority under Section 5 to the unquestionably plenary grants of Article I, including the Necessary
and Proper Clause, the Court made clear that Congress's Section
5 authority is not limited to prohibiting acts identified by the
Court as unconstitutional.35 In other words, the question whether
a legislative "end" is "legitimate" under McCulloch does not turn
30See Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641, 650 (1966) ("By including § 5 the draftsmen
sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. 1, § 8,
cl. 18."). See also Part JI.B (explaining that the history of Fourteenth Amendment supports
this reading).
3 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
32Id at 42 1.

11Id at 407.
34384 US 641 (1966).
31See id at 648 (rejecting argument that legislation cannot be sustained as "appropriate"
under Section 5 unless it prohibits governmental action that the Fourteenth Amendment,
as interpreted by Court, forbids of its own force).
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on whether the Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment
to require the same result by its own force.
If Congress were limited under Section 5 merely to prohibiting
constitutional violations under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court would have been compelled to invalidate the
provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 at issue in Morgan.
Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act 36 prevented the states from
enforcing a literacy requirement for voting in the case of persons
educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant classroom language was other than English; its primary effect was to
bar New York from applying an English literacy requirement to
New York City residents from Puerto Rico. However, the Court
previously had held in Lassiter v Northampton Election Board 7 that
state literacy qualifications for voting do not, on their face, violate
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the Attorney General of New York argued that Congress could not prohibit under the fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment state
action the Court was unwilling to proscribe under the first.38 The
Court rejected this narrow view of Section 5 authority: "Correctly
viewed, section 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 39 The proper inquiry, therefore, was whether
the Court could "perceive a basis" for the congressional determi-4 °
nation that an occasion justifying national legislation was present.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan offered two distinct rationales for holding section 4(e) to be "appropriate legislation" to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment, notwithstanding
the facial validity of state literacy barriers. Under the first rationale, which might be termed "remedial" or "preventative," Congress is empowered by Section 5 to enact preventative measures
reaching conduct that does not expressly violate the Fourteenth
6
Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(e), Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 439 (codified as amended
at 42 USC § 1973b(e) (1994)).
37360 US 45 (1959).
31See Morgan, 384 US at 648.
35

Id at 651.
4 Id at 653. Compare Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US 294, 303-04 (1964) ("[Where we
find [that Congress had a] rational basis for finding the chosen regulatory scheme necessary
to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.").
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Amendment in order to ensure practical enjoyment of the amendment's guarantees as well as to remove obstacles to the states' performance of their obligations under the amendment. Justice Brennan reasoned that Section 4(e) "may be viewed as a measure to
secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by government-both in the imposition
of voting qualifications and the provision or administration of governmental services. '41 Thus, despite the absence in the record of
any actual discrimination by New York in the provision of such
services, the Morgan Court held that Congress appropriately could
act in a prophylactic fashion to ensure that Puerto Ricans have
the political power that will enable them "better to obtain 'perfect
equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws.' "42
Justice Brennan's remedial justification was supported by the
43
Court's ruling earlier that term in South Carolina v Katzenbach
upholding, as "appropriate legislation" under the Enforcement
Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment, 44 provisions of the Voting
Right Act45 that authorized the suspension of literacy tests and
other practices in particular states even though discriminatory application of such requirements had not been demonstrated for all
of the covered jurisdictions.4 ' The South Carolina Court, while
noting that Congress could not reach "evils not comprehended
by the Fifteenth Amendment, ' 47 rejected a narrow and "artificial"
reading of the Fifteenth Amendment that would limit Congress's
power to generally forbidding violations of the amendment and
perhaps crafting additional sanctions for such violations. 48 Instead,
it emphasized, as it would again in Morgan,4 9 that the framers of
the Reconstruction Amendments intended that "Congress was to

"Morgan, 384 US at 652.
42Id at 653 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US 339, 346 (1879)).
43383 US 301 (1966).
4US Const, Amend XV ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.").
4s42 USC §§ 1973i, 1973j(a)-(c) (1994).
11See South Carolina, 383 US at 329-30.
1Id at 326.
4
1Id at 327.
49Katzenbacb v Morgan, 384 US 641, 648 & n 7 (1966).
47
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be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created" by
those amendments. 0
The second, and more controversial, rationale offered by the
Morgan Court was that Section 5 confers independent authority
on Congress to find that a state practice violates the Fourteenth
Amendment even if the Court is unwilling to make the same determination."1 This second rationale suggests that Congress has
power under Section 5 to determine the substantive scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and accordingly typically is referred to
as Morgan's "substantive" theory.
It is unclear, however, that the Morgan Court meant what its
words have been taken to imply. Some commentators point to Justice Brennan's statement that "it is enough that we perceive a basis
upon which Congress might predicate a judgment that the application of New York's English literacy requirement . . . constituted
an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause" 2 as evidence that the Court accorded Congress some substantive or definitional 3 authority with respect to the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment.54 But since Morgan involved what was
essentially an alienage classification restricting the exercise of voting, a judicially denominated "fundamental right, '5 5 Justice Brennan's second rationale could be read narrowly to acknowledge only
that Congress's power under Section 5 allows it to subject a state's
justification for such a classification to its own demanding scrutiny. 6 Under this reading, Congress's superior fact-finding re5 South Carolina, 383 US at 326. As the Court later explained in City of Rome v United
States, 446 US 156, 173 (1980), the holding in South Carolina made clear "that Congress
may, under the authority of § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibit state action that,
though in itself not violative of § 1, perpetuates the effects of past discrimination."
5" See Morgan, 384 US at 656.
52 Id.
" For our view that the terms "substantive" and "definitional" mean different things and
should not be confused, see Part I.B.I.
54See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an UnconstitutionalStatute, 56 Mont L Rev 39, 47-48 (1995); Eugene Gressman and Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 Ohio St L
J 65, 70 n 17 (1996).
" See Harper v Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 US 663, 667 (1966) (citing Reynolds v Sims, 377
US 533, 561-62 (1961); Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 370 (1886)).
"See City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 528 (1997) (suggesting that Morgan's second
rationale turned on whether Court could "perceive[] a factual basis on which Congress
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sources would enable it to override a state justification that the
Court, necessarily engaging in a more limited inquiry because of
institutional constraints, might sustain.
Nor does a definitional role for Congress necessarily follow
from Justice Brennan's famous "ratchet" limitation on Section 5based legislation. In his Morgan dissent, Justice Harlan accused the
majority of clothing Congress with "the power to define the substantive scope of the [Fourteenth] Amendment," and thus "to exercise its Section 5 'discretion' by enacting statutes so as in effect
to dilute the equal protection and due process decisions of this
Court. ' 57 Rather than deny that the majority opinion recognized
any definitional authority in Congress, Justice Brennan responded
only to Justice Harlan's suggestion that Congress could, pursuant
to its Section 5 powers, restrict constitutional protections established by the Court:58 "We emphasize that Congress' power under
§ 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the
Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or
dilute these guarantees." 59
Some have understood this language to support a broad definitional role for Congress under the auspices of Section 5.6 Yet,
again, it is not clear that this is the best reading of Morgan. It does
not follow from the fact that Congress cannot dilute constitutional
protections that it is free to enlarge them. Moreover, the fact that
Congress has discretion to reach conduct that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not prohibit of its own force does not mean that
Congress has any authority to define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, it simply means that, within the constitutional framework set forth by the Court, Congress is entitled
to substantial deference; it may enact appropriate legislation recould have concluded that New York's literacy requirement 'constituted an invidious discrmination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause"' (quoting Morgan, 384 US at 656)).
" 7Morgan, 384 US at 668 (Harlan dissenting).
s8See id at 651 n 10 ("[Section) 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion
in the other direction and to enact 'statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and
due process decisions of this Court.' ").
5
9Id.
60See, e.g., Thomas W. Beimers, Searching for the Structural Vision of City of Boerne v.
Flores: Vertical and Horizontal Tensions in the New Constitutional Architecture, 26 Hastings
Const L Q 789, 797 (1999); Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of ConstitutionalDecisions, 53 U Chi L Rev 819, 830 (1986); Brief for Petitioner at
38, City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507 (1997) (No 95-2074).
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sponsive to due process and equal protection concerns that the
Court itself has identified.6" Indeed, nothing in Morgan grants to
Congress anything more than another fairly generous basis of legislative authority, analogous in breadth to the Commerce Clause
and other powers enumerated in Article I. What Morgan, and
South Carolina before it, accomplished was to bring Section 5based legislation within the McCulloch tradition of deferential review of congressional authority to legislate as against the reserved
powers of the states.
Four years after Morgan, the Court had occasion to reevaluate
the scope of congressional power under Section 5. In Oregon v
Mitchell,62 the Court reviewed the 1970 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act, which lowered to eighteen years the age barrier for
voting in state and federal elections. 63 The case provided an ideal
test for Congress's supposed definitional authority. Because the
Court already had recognized voting as a fundamental constitutional right, 64 a definitional theory would argue that Congress
could interpret the Constitution to prohibit an arbitrary judgment
that maturity in voting does not occur until twenty-one years of
age. In Mitchell, however, a sharply divided Court ruled against
the assertion of Section 5 authority for state elections. Four Justices squarely rejected the notion that Congress has any authority
to define the substantive requirements of the Constitution, while
Justice Black cast the deciding vote on non-Fourteenth Amendment grounds.6 5 Only Justice Brennan, writing also for Justices
61Once we understand that Congress has no power under Section 5 (or any other provision of the Constitution, for that matter) to define the meaning of the Constitution, Justice
Brennan's ratchet footnote makes sense: Legislation that purported to restrict constitutional
rights would, in fact, authorize constitutional violations and so would be invalid on that
ground. An example of such legislation is the proposed Human Life Bill, S 158, 97th Cong,
1st Sess, 127 Cong Rec S8429 (daily ed July 24, 1981), introduced in Congress in 1981 as
a response to the Court's ruling in Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). The bill would have
prohibited federal courts from invalidating or restraining the operation of state laws prohibiting abortions-laws the Court had held violate the Constitution. The problem with the
Human Life Bill was not that it would have redefined the meaning of the Constitution
(for there is no reason to think a statute could do so), but that it explicitly authorized
unconstitutional state action and shielded such action from judicial review. See Samuel
Estreicher, CongressionalPower and ConstitutionalRights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life"
Legislation, 68 Va L Rev 333 (1982).
62

400 US 112 (1970).
63Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub L No 91-285, 84 Stat 314.

4 See, e.g., Kramer v Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 US 621 (1969). See also note 55.
65See Mitchell, 400 US at 117, 119-30 (opinion of Justice Black) (reasoning that Congress

had power to regulate federal elections under Article I, Section 4 and the Necessary and
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Marshall and White, would have sustained the eighteen-year-old
vote for all elections under the second rationale of Morgan, arguing
that Section 5 empowers Congress to "determine whether the factual basis necessary to support a state legislative discrimination actually exists."'6 6 Although, as in Morgan, Justice Brennan and those
in agreement with him endorsed broad language that arguably recognized Congress's definitional authority under Section 5, the emphasis of Justice Brennan's opinion in Mitchell was on Congress's
superior fact-finding competence, which enables it to subject state
restrictions on the fundamental right to vote to its own heightened
scrutiny.
Morgan's first rationale-recognizing congressional power to act
prophylactically "to secure" Fourteenth Amendment guaranteesappears to have survived Mitchell intact, and was reaffirmed in City
of Rome v United States.6" After Mitchell, however, the continued
vitality of the second branch of the Morgan opinion, to the extent
that it acknowledged congressional authority to define the reach of
the amendment, was far from clear. Although Mitchell's fractured
holding cannot be said to have dealt a decisive death blow to the
definitional theory, none of the Justices seemed prepared to sign
on to the broadest possible reading of Morgan. The rationale's disuse in subsequent opinions, moreover, is unmistakable.68 Nevertheless, the question whether Congress has authority under Section 5 independently to determine the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment was not decided conclusively until the Supreme
Court's 1997 decision in City of Boerne v Flores.6 9
Proper Clause, but that the power to determine qualifications for state elections was expressly delegated to states under Article I, Section 2).
' Id at 248 (Brennan, White, and Marshall concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67446 US 156 (1980). Although recognizing that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits
only purposeful discrimination, the Court in City of Rome upheld the Voting Rights Act's
ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect only, see id at 167, reasoning
that "Congress could rationally have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the
risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact." Id at 177.
" For example, the Court in City of Rome relied solely on Morgan's remedial theory,
although the case could easily have been decided on grounds of Congress's definitional
authority. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of Morgan's "substantive" theory, see
Estreicher at 436-38 & nn 338, 340-42 (cited in note 61).
69521 US 507 (1997).
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CITY OF BOERNE V FLORES'S REJECTION OF THE
DEFINITIONAL THEORY

In Department of Human Resources v Smith,7 ° the Supreme Court
rejected the claim that the Free Exercise Clause requires that neutral, nondiscriminatory, generally applicable laws be subjected to
strict scrutiny whenever they impose a burden on religious activities. The Smith Court reasoned that the compelling state interest
test set forth in Sherbert v Verner7 1 was unworkable in the context
of religious exemptions; however, the decision rested more fundamentally on the Court's view that it would be a "constitutional
anomaly" to use the compelling state interest test to secure for
religious believers "a private right to ignore generally applicable
laws.""2 Congress emphatically disagreed. With the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA or Act),73 Congress sought to restore the compelling state interest test as the operative standard for
neutral, generally applicable laws that burden religiously motivated
conduct.
RFRA, from its statement of purpose to its substantive components, had an undeniably constitutional tenor. The Act began by
stating that "[t]he framers of the Constitution, recognizing free
exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection
in the First Amendment to the Constitution." 74 Its substantive test
likewise was framed in patently constitutional terms. Faced with a
claimant whose religiously motivated conduct had been burdened
by a law of general applicability, a court applying RFRA would
ask, as it had under the Court's pre-Smith First Amendment jurisprudence, whether the claimant's "exercise of religion" had been
"substantially burdened," and, if so, would apply the "compelling
state interest" test.75 For the purposes of the Act, the term "exercise of religion" was defined as "the exercise of religion under the

70494 US 872 (1990).
71 374 US 398 (1963).
72Smith, 494 US at 886.
71Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (codified
at 42 USC § 2000bb (1994)).
74Id § 2000bb(a)(1).
71Id § 2000bb-l(a) to (b).
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First Amendment to the Constitution."7 6 Moreover, RFRA's express purpose was to "restore" the compelling state interest test
rejected in Smith and "guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 77 Thus, in
Boerne, the Court was confronted directly with the question
whether Section 5 grants Congress the power to define the meaning of the Constitution. Not surprisingly, the Court's answer was
an emphatic-and unanimous-no.78
The Court began with the obvious. After reaffirming its prior
holdings according Congress broad discretion under Section 5 to
remedy or prevent constitutional violations-"even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and
intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved
to the States'" 79-the Court reiterated that, "'[a]s broad as the
congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.'"80 It then
squarely rejected the notion that Congress's authority to enforce
Section 5 embraces the power to define the meaning of the
Constitution:
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on
the States. Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.
Congress does not enforce a right by changing what the
right is."'
All this seems clear enough, and, indeed, fairly uncontroversial.
RFRA rather obviously sought to change the operative meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause; as Justice Ginsburg noted at oral argument, the question whether the Act actually redefined the clause
76Id

§ 2000bb-2(4).

77Id § 2000bb(b)(1). Indeed, when President Clinton signed it into law, he commented

that RFRA "reverses the Supreme Court's decision [in] Employment Division against
Smith." Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, II Pub Papers
2000 (Nov 16, 1993).
" City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 519 (1997). Justices Breyer and Souter expressed
no view on the merits of the question whether RFRA was a valid exercise of Congress's
Section 5 power and instead wrote separately to renew their objection to the holding in
Smith. See id at 565-66 (Souter dissenting); id at 566 (Breyer dissenting).
Id at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v Biter, 427 US 445, 455 (1976)).
Id (quoting Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112, 128 (1970)).
"Id at 519.
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was academic where its practical effect was to render Smith a dead
letter. 2 Thus, the Court easily could have decided Boerne on the
narrow ground that Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, while broad, does not allow it to compel the courts
to adopt a particular construction of the Constitution.
On this view, the true infirmity of RFRA was one of congressional co-optation of judicial authority.83 The Court long ago made
clear that it will reject any attempts by Congress to prescribe a
"rule of decision" for future cases. In United States v Klein,8 4 the
Court invalidated legislation providing that proof of a presidential
pardon was to be deemed by the courts as conclusive evidence that
the recipient had "given . . . aid or comfort" to the confederate
forces during the Civil War. 5 The Court earlier had held that
presidential pardons had precisely the opposite effect: They effectively erase whatever wrong the pardon's recipient had committed.
As Professor Sager has explained, what was so displeasing to the
Klein Court was that Congress had attempted to conscript the "articulate authority" of the judiciary; "the Justices were being asked
to implicate themselves in what they saw as an injustice, and furthermore, to do so in the public light of judicial reason-giving for
articulate reasons that went to the heart of the injustice." 86 Thus,
Sager identifies as "Klein's first principle" the notion that "the judiciary will resist efforts to make it seem to support and regularize
that with which it in fact disagrees."'"
RFRA seems a particularly egregious violation of this principle.
The fact that it, like the legislation at issue in Klein, created prohibitions grounded in a statute as opposed to the Constitution itself,
does little to remove the sting. Sager has us consider the aftermath
of Boerne had the Court upheld RFRA in full:
Throughout the federal judiciary, judges in dozens or perhaps
hundreds of cases would apply something called the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. They would determine whether the
, Oral Argument at *39, Boerne (No 95-2074) (statement of Justice Ginsburg).
Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's First Principle:A Proposed Solution, 86 Geo L J 2525,
2532 (1998).
- 80 US (13 Wall) 128 (1871).
15 Id at 146-47.
.86 Sager at 2529 (cited in note 83).
13 See
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complainants' "exercise of religion" had been "substantially
burdened." Then they would determine whether the offending
governmental act was "the least restrictive means" of furthering "a compelling state interest." Each of these terms would
be analyzed and given operational content, the application of
one or more would be contested in each case, lawyers would
plead these terms and argue to them, and judges would rule
and offer these terms as central to the motivation of their ruling. In high visibility cases, newspapers would report on these
terms as they appeared in courthouse step declamations, legal
briefs, and judicial opinions. 8
Such a picture clearly is inconsistent with well-accepted principles of separation of powers. The separation of powers difficulties,
however, are both narrow in scope and rare.89 The problem with
RFRA was not that Congress had attempted, by statute, to create
rights not required by the Constitution, but that Congress had
defined those extra-constitutional rights in constitutional terms.
Just as Congress has no power to change the content of the Constitution by ordinary legislation, so it is powerless to change the
effective meaning of constitutional provisions by forcing the judiciary to act as its constitutional ventriloquist. Respect for separation of powers means, in this context, that Congress may not require the courts to say that the "exercise of religion under the First
Amendment" means one thing when the Court has determined it
means another. RFRA therefore violated the principle of Klein by
enlisting the judiciary in Congress's constitutional misrepresentation. That alone was sufficient to render the Act unconstitutional,
for reasons wholly unrelated to its status as Section 5-based
legislation.
The Boerne Court did not, however, rest its decision on these
grounds. Instead, it attempted to distinguish between a "substantive" and "remedial" role for Congress. In what has been aptly
described as "the understatement of the Term,"9 the Court noted
that "the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in
the governing law is not easy to discern."'" With this statement,
8

Id at 2535.
9 For discussion of another similarly rare and limited instance where separation of powers
concerns are implicated in the context of Section 5-based legislation, see note 61.
91Cole at 46 (cited in note 4).
91City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 519 (1997).
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the Court came face to face with the mystique of Section 5, and
understandably left the encounter wholly mystified. It is indeed
difficult-if not impossible-to distinguish between measures that
properly can be deemed remedial or preventative and those that are
appropriately viewed as substantive. All legislation, even that which
is obviously remedial, works "a substantive change in the governing law." As a practical matter, there often is little difference
between creating a new right and remedying or preventing the
violation of an existing right. From the perspective of the rightholder, both types of legislation are "substantive" in that they enable her to assert a claim or obtain relief where previously she
could not.92
If Congress has remedial authority to act in a prophylactic manner to prevent violations from occurring, as the Court repeatedly
has held,93 it necessarily exercises a substantive authority. But if
we recognize that remedial or preventative legislation can and often does have substantive effects, must we conclude that Congress
can, through ordinary legislation, define the meaning of the constitutional provisions it "enforces"?
1. Demystifying Section 5: Separation of powers and federalism.
Much of the mystique of Section 5 lies in the notion that when
Congress enacts legislation that might be termed "substantive"for example, legislation that imposes statutory requirements above
and beyond that which the Constitution requires on its own-it
has somehow changed the meaning of the Constitution. This notion finds its roots in Morgan's second rationale, which hinted at
such a definitional role for Congress. However, a much more satis92 This assumes, of course, that there may be a gap between right and remedy. The
Court's distinction between substantive and remedial legislation might make sense if we
imagined that the only rights individuals have under the Constitution are those they can
vindicate in court; that the constitutional guarantee of equality, for example, is coterminous
with the Court's enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause. On this view, Congress may
remedy or prevent constitutional violations only to the extent that a court could do the
same in, say, a nationwide class action. However, the Court consistently has rejected such
a narrow view of Congress's Section 5 power. See note 35 and accompanying text. See also
United States v Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740, 1755 (2000); Kimel, 120 S Ct at 644; Boerne, 521
US at 518-20.
" See Boerne, 521 US at 526 (noting that, "[a]fter South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court
continued to acknowledge the necessity of using strong remedial and preventative measures
to respond to the widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights resulting
from this country's history of racial discrimination" (citing City of Rome v United States,
446 US 156 (1980); Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112 (1970); Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US
641 (1966))).
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fying (and significantly less puzzling) interpretation of the Section
5 authority recognized in Morgan is that, rather than granting authority over the interpretation of the Constitution itself, Section 5
is simply a source of legislative authority to create statutory rights
enhancing the constitutional values identified by the Court. Although these values, or areas of constitutional concern, are found
in the Court's decisions, Congress's legislative authority is not tied
to the particular resolutions struck by the Court. In effect, the
Constitution-and the Court's authoritative interpretations of itsupplies an appropriate source of norms upon which legislation
may rest.94 The distinction is between what, for example, the Equal
Protection Clause requires of its own force, and thus is a matter
of self-enforcement through the courts, and what Congress may
require in enacting appropriate legislation pursuant to that clause.
We will go a long way toward demystifying the question of congressional authority under Section 5 once we recognize that "substantive" and "definitional" are not synonymous. That Congress,
under its authority to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, may reach conduct that the Constitution does not
prohibit by its own force, does not, by itself, implicate the separation of powers concerns raised by RFRA and discussed above. The
problem with RFRA was that it purported to change-effectively,
if not literally-the meaning of the First Amendment. Rather
than effectuate First Amendment values within the constitutional
framework set forth by the Court, RFRA sought to change that
framework by reviving a constitutional test the Court had rejected
and mandating its application in every case involving the exercise
of religion. The Klein problem raised by RFRA is not only rare,
but also quite obvious: it arises only when Congress defines statutory rights using constitutional language and so requires the Court
to act as its mouthpiece in explaining and applying terms like "exercise of religion. 'g5 Thus, if we revisit the Court's attempt to deCompare Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword:Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv L Rev 1 (1975). Monaghan's theory of constitutional common lawin which the Court refers to the Constitution as a source of law permitting the development
of supplementary common law rules-is, in a sense, the judicial version of the theory of
legislative power advanced here.
'5 At oral argument in Boerne, Justice Souter asked whether the particular separation of
powers concern identified by the petitioners was simply a question of congressional candor.
See Oral Argument at *5-*6, Boerne (No 95-2074) (statement of Justice Souter) (suggesting
that argument against RFRA "would be different had Congress simply kept its cards closer
to its vest"). The answer should have been yes. The separation of powers problem at issue
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lineate the bounds of Congress's Section 5 authority, substituting
"definitional" for "substantive," it turns out that the line between
preventative or remedial measures that give full effect to constitutional guarantees the Court has identified, and those that profess
to (re)define the meaning of those guarantees, is not particularly
difficult to discern after all.
But if "substantive" legislation that avoids the definitional problems of RFRA does not raise concerns about Congress usurping
the power of the courts, it may raise a different set of concerns.
The Court in Boerne reaffirmed the principle that Congress is entitled to deference, not only in its choice of legislative means, but
also in its identification of appropriate legislative ends.96 Yet the
Court was well aware that, to the extent that Congress is granted
discretion independently to identify a need for federal legislation
under its Section 5 enforcement power, the sphere of federal
power expands and that reserved to the states contracts. Thus, even
if we recognize that the Court properly can defer to Congress's
rational conclusions regarding the need for federal legislation to
address matters of constitutional concern without intruding upon
the province of the judiciary, we might still worry about ceding
to Congress too much power to determine the bounds of its own
authority vis-a-vis that of the states. It is crucial to understand that
this has nothing to do with separation of powers and everything to do
with federalism. Nor is this concern specific to Section 5. In this
respect, Section 5 is no more mysterious than any of the provisions
in Article I granting Congress authority to act. With regard to the
latter provisions, courts consistently97 defer to Congress's reasoned
judgment regarding the appropriateness of federal legislation. It is
true that in such circumstances Congress is in a sense independently interpreting the Constitution, but the Court remains the
final arbiter of constitutional meaning, as is clear from its recent
decisions overturning legislation based on what it saw as an unin Boerne was very simple, limited, and could indeed have been cured by a different choice
of language. That is not to say that there were not other problems with RFRA. However,
those problems had nothing to do with separation of powers. See Part I.B.2.
" Boerne, 521 US at 536 ("It is for Congress in the first instance to 'determin[e] whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,'
and its conclusions are entitled to much deference." (quoting Katzenbach v Morgan, 384
US 641, 651 (1966))).
"7Until recently, that is. See note 98.
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reasonably broad congressional understanding of the Commerce
Clause.9 8 Those decisions rested on grounds, not of separation of
powers, but of federalism.99
2. Congruence and proportionality: The question of legislative ends.
The Court in Boerne proposed the following test to distinguish
between acceptably remedial or preventative legislation, and that
which is unacceptably "substantive": "There must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect."'' 0 This test, the Court explained, is designed to ensure that
"the object of valid § 5 legislation [is] the carefully delimited remediation or prevention of constitutional violations." 0' It is, in other
words, an inquiry into whether Congress's legislative ends are "legitimate."1 2 But it is not immediately apparent how an inquiry
into congruence and proportionality between legislative means and
ends can provide any useful guidance in determining whether Congress has acted within its enumerated powers so as to maintain the
proper balance of state-federal power.
The Court long has recognized that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to "limit[ ] the power of the states and
enlarge[] . . .the power of Congress."'' 3 Accordingly, it is both

inevitable and entirely appropriate that Section 5-based legislation
will increase the power of the federal government in relation to
9 See United States v Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740, 1747-54 (2000) (holding that Congress
lacked power under the Commerce Clause to enact civil remedy provision of VAWA);
United States v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its commerce
power in enacting the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 USC § 922(q)(1)(A)).
'9See, e.g., Morrison, 120 S Ct at 1752-53 (expressing concern about potential intrusion
of Congress's commerce power into traditional areas of state concern); Lopez, 514 US at
556-57 (warning against extending commerce power so as to "'effectively obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government'" (quoting NLRB v Jones & Laugblin Steel Corp., 301 US 1, 37 (1937))). Compare Printz v United States, 521 US 898 (1997) (holding that the Tenth Amendment bars
the federal government from commandeering state executive); New York v United States,
505 US 144 (1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment forbids Congress to commandeer
state government by forcing states to choose between legislating in accordance with federal
scheme or taking tide to radioactive waste).
'o Boerne, 521 US at 520.
mo Fla. PrepaidPostsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v College Savings Bank, 527 US 627, 647
(1999).
°2McCullocb v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819).
103
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US 339, 345 (1879).
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that of the states. The question for the Court in any case concerning the validity of such legislation is whether the legislative end
is legitimate, that is, whether the "injury to be prevented or remedied" is one properly understood to reside within the constitutional provision in question. If the legislation is a proper exercise
of Congress's Section 5 authority, it will alter the federal balance
in favor of the federal government and against the states. But the
same will be true if the legislation is not a valid Section 5 enactment. We cannot assess the appropriateness of Section 5-based
legislation by looking to whether the legislation intrudes on the
provinces of the states, because any Section 5-based legislation,
whether permissible or impermissible, necessarily will so intrude.
Nor can we determine whether Congress has exceeded its power
under Section 5 by reference to the magnitude of the intrusion on
state affairs. The question whether a burden on the states is valid
or invalid turns on whether Congress has the requisite Section 5
authority to impose it: If such authority exists, the imposition is
valid even if it is quite significant; conversely, if such authority is
lacking, the imposition is invalid no matter how slight.
Thus, in cases in which the legislative end is evident, either on
the face of the statute or from the legislative record, the congruence and proportionality test is neither necessary nor sufficient to
the determination of whether the end is a legitimate one. The test
does have a proper role to play, however, in cases where it is unclear what constitutional concern informs a Section 5 enactment.
As the Court has explained, its initial task in any case involving
the constitutionality of Section 5-based legislation is to "identify
the Fourteenth Amendment 'evil' or 'wrong' that Congress intended to remedy." 1" In some cases, it may be difficult for the
Court to identify with any specificity the injury Congress is seeking to redress or prevent, because the legislative record may be
devoid of any congressional findings with regard to the injury it
has targeted.
It is, of course, preferable that Congress put its superior factfinding capabilities to use. Congress should, whenever possible,
compile a detailed legislative record identifying the injury it hopes
to remedy or prevent, and the ways in which its chosen means will
help achieve its object. But in some situations, the object of Section
"IFloridaPrepaid, 119

S Ct at 2207.
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5-based legislation-the injury to be remedied or prevented-is
not well documented in the legislative record. In such circumstances, the congruence and proportionality test can prove useful:
The Court is faced with post hoc rationalizations for congressional
action, but it is unclear from the statute in question and its legislative history that Congress actually identified a problem of constitutional concern so as to bring the measure within its Section 5
power. The Court, however, wants to give Congress the benefit
of the doubt. So it begins with the assumption that the legislative
end is a legitimate one, that the injury to be prevented or remedied
is within an area of constitutional concern, as identified by the
Court. The Court then looks at the means Congress adopted to
reach this hypothetical end; it attempts to identify what Congress
intended to do by looking at what it did.'05
The Boerne Court's application of the congruence and proportionality test, while unnecessary, 0 6 was consistent with this reasoning. In its brief and in oral argument before the Court, the United
States attempted to characterize RFRA as a remedial measure
aimed at rooting out intentional discrimination that might not be
captured by the Smith test.0 7 This characterization is more than
a little implausible, but the Court correctly declined to dismiss it
out of hand. It first examined RFRA's legislative record to assess
whether Congress had reason to believe that legislation was necessary in order to remedy or prevent the sort of invidious discrimination the Constitution forbids. Finding that Congress had not identified any recent instances in which generally applicable laws were
in fact passed because of religious bigotry,' the Court went on
10,Professors Hamilton and Schoenbrod have defended the congruence and proportionality test on different grounds. See Marci A. Hamilton and David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 Cardozo L
Rev 469 (1999). They argue that the test may be justified by reference to the law of remedies, which requires that any judicially crafted remedy must respond proportionally to the
wrong it seeks to redress. Hamilton and Schoenbrod's argument is both thoughtful and
thought provoking. In our view, however, it is ultimately unpersuasive, for it fails satisfactorily to explain why Congress's power should be adjudged by the same standards that govern
the ability of lower courts to fashion remedies for constitutional or statutory violations.
"6 As discussed above, the Court could have disposed of RFRA on the narrow ground
that it violated the principle of Klein. See notes 74-83.
117 Oral Argument at *53-*56, Boerne (No 95-2074) (statements
of Acting Solicitor General Dellinger); Brief for the United States at 28-35, Boerne (No 95-2074). See also Brief
for Respondent Flores at 30-34, Boerne (No 95-2074).
"' See Boerne, 521 US at 530-3 1.
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to inquire into the operation of the Act to determine whether the
ends it actually accomplished were, in fact, permissible. What it
found was a measure notable for its "sweeping coverage," which
promised to intrude into every level of government, displacing
countless laws of general applicability and unquestionable constitutionality."°9 In short, RFRA failed the congruence and proportionality test, and badly. "' The costs it imposed on the states were
wholly out of proportion to any constitutional gains it might have
secured.
It is important to note here that the question for the Court was
not whether RFRA would result in exemptions for religiously motivated conduct that were not themselves required by Smith. If
RFRA had targeted only a certain category of state laws-say,
prison grooming requirements arguably burdening Muslim observance-that would have passed muster under Smith, the case
would have been a much closer one. The Court then would have
been forced to inquire whether it could "perceive a basis" on
which Congress could have concluded that the targeted group of
laws implicated First Amendment concerns. The congruence and
proportionality test, however, allows the Court to avoid this difficult inquiry in cases like Boerne, where there was an immense gap
between what Congress did and what Congress plausibly could
have done under the deferential McCulloch standard.
C.

KIMEL AND FLORIDA PREPAID: CONGRUENCE
AND PROPORTIONALITY APPLIED

The Court's subsequent decision in Kimel v Florida Board of Regents"' provides another useful example of the operation of the
congruence and proportionality test. The question for the Court
in Kimel was whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) 112 could be sustained as a valid exercise of Congress's
power under Section 5. Previous cases had established that the
Fourteenth Amendment permits states to discriminate on the basis
'9Id at 532-34.
.0 See id at 532 ("RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative
object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.").
"1 120 S Ct 631 (2000).
11229 USC §§ 621-633a (1994).
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of age as long as the age classification at issue is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.113 Age-based classifications, the Court
reasoned, do not raise the same constitutional concerns as classifications based on race or gender, as they often serve as a useful
proxy for characteristics relevant to the state's legitimate interests.
Moreover, given that old age happens to all of us, such classifications also are less likely to be based on the kind of irrational prejudice the Constitution forbids.
It was therefore no easy task for Congress to justify on Section 5 grounds the ADEA's comprehensive prohibition of all agebased employment decisions by the states. 14 The Court correctly
recognized that the ADEA was not doomed simply because it prohibited conduct the Court had permitted (or would in the future
permit) in the context of constitutional litigation.' 5 Congress legitimately could "prohibit a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not prohibited by the [Fourteenth] Amendment's text" in the course of giving full effect to the rights
guaranteed thereunder. 6 But if differential treatment of the elderly was not, according to the Court's equal protection precedents, an area of heightened constitutional concern, then the
ADEA could qualify as "appropriate legislation" under Section 5
only if the Court could perceive a rational basis for a congressional
judgment that broad prophylactic measures were necessary in order to protect the elderly from arbitrary and invidious discrimination.
Had Congress found that state employers had engaged in systematic arbitrary age-based discrimination, the Court's inquiry
would have been limited to traditional highly deferential assessment of the means Congress employed to achieve the permissible
goal of rooting out such discrimination. The problem in Kimel was
that Congress had not identified any evidence that states generally
were discriminating against their employees on the basis of age. 7
This made the Court's task significantly more difficult. Judicial
113Kimel, 120 S Ct at 645-46 (citing Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452 (1991); Vance v
Bradley, 440 US 93 (1979); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307 (1976) (per

curiam)).
114See 29 USC § 623(a)(1).
"' See Kimel, 120 S Ct at 645.

116Id.
117See id at 648-49.
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deference typically does not require legislative findings. Deference
is owed not because of the state of the legislative record Congress
compiles, but out of respect for the principle that Congress is enti118
tled to decide in the first instance whether legislation is needed.
At the same time, however, Congress has no authority to act under
Section 5 except to effectuate the constitutional values residing in
the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, before the Court can defer to
Congress's judgment that Section 5-based legislation is needed to
remedy or prevent constitutional harms or to ensure full enjoyment of constitutional rights, it must first satisfy itself that Con9
gress did make-or rationally could have madel' -such a judgment. When, having utilized its fact-finding capabilities to study
the issue in question, Congress does decide that there exists a
problem of constitutional proportions, the Court must defer to
12 °
that judgment as long as it can "perceive a basis" for it. But
when, as in Kimel, Congress did not in fact legislate on the basis
of a reasoned judgment, supported by appropriate findings, that
the elderly generally were in need of statutory protections in order
to ward off unconstitutional discrimination by state employers, the
Court must ask whether Congress, had it studied the problem,
could rationally have concluded that such legislation was needed.
Rather than engage in an abstract hypothetical inquiry into Congress's subjective intent, in such circumstances the Court looks instead at the measures Congress adopted to determine whether they
are plausibly designed to target an area of constitutional concern.
Consistent with this analysis, the Court in Kimel invoked the
congruence and proportionality test as a means of assessing
whether the ADEA could be seen as permissibly remedial or preventative or whether it was impermissibly "substantive"12 '-that
City ofBoerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 531-32 (1997).
"'Admittedly, record evidence was absent in Morgan, but the Court was satisfied that
Congress rationally could have made findings adequate to support its suspension of literacy
tests for individuals education in U.S.-flag schools.
'2°Katzenbacb v Morgan, 384 US 641, 656 (1966).
121 Kmel, 120 S Ct at 644. The Court in Kimel appears to have repeated the mistake it had
made previously in Boerne of conflating separation of powers concerns-that is, concerns over
a definitional role for Congress-with federalism concerns. To the extent that the Court in
either case meant to suggest that legislation that goes too far in overprotecting constitutional
rights "effects a substantive redefinition" of the rights at issue, id (emphasis added), the Court's
terminology should be revisited. The Fourteenth Amendment rights at issue have not changed
one iota, and mean precisely the same thing before the ADEA's extension to the states as after
it. What has changed, however, is the balance of state-federal power.
1'
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is, whether the Act strayed too far beyond the bounds of constitutional concern as identified by the Court.' Like RFRA, the ADEA
failed the test. Of primary importance to the Court was that the
ADEA, even with its "extremely narrow""2 3 exception for bona fide
occupational qualifications,' 24 made a state employer's reliance on
age presumptively unlawful. This across-the-board statutory presumption against the use of age-based classifications struck the
Court as grossly disproportionate to the requirements of the Constitution. Because the means Congress had adopted to effectuate
its legislative goal went so far beyond what the Constitution accomplishes of its own force, the Court refused to presume that
the object of the ADEA was to enhance or protect constitutional
values under Section 1.
The Court undertook a similar analysis in FloridaPrepaidPostsecondary Education Expense Board v College Savings Bank, 2 ' in which
it considered whether the Patent Remedy Act2 6 could be sustained
as an exercise of Congress's power under Section 5. The Court
began its analysis by identifying the "evil" or "wrong" that Congress intended to remedy or prevent.'27 That evil, it appeared, was
state infringement of patents and the use of state sovereign immunity to deny patent owners compensation for invasion of their patent rights. 2 ' In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress
had neglected to adduce any evidence of a pattern of patent infringement by the states, "let alone a pattern of constitutional [due
process] violations."' 29 Nor did Congress appear to have considered
122Concededly, the inquiry in Kimel did not follow the sequence we recommend. Rather,
the Court first applied the congruence and proportionality test and, finding that the ADEA
did not satisfy it, proceeded to ask whether the legislative record revealed that Congress
had identified a problem the Court might have missed. That the inquiry was somewhat
inverted, however, is not significant. What is important to note about Kimel is that the
Court appeared prepared to defer to a reasoned congressional judgment regarding a legitimate object of Section 5 legislation. Finding that such a judgment had not, in fact, been
made, the Court was forced to rely on the congruence and proportionality test to determine
whether such a judgment, had it been made, would have supported the ADEA.
23Western Air Lines, Inc. v Criswell, 472 US 400, 412 (1985) (interpreting ADEA provision
recognizing defense based on bona fide occupational qualifications).
12429 USC § 623(0(1).
125119 S Ct 2199 (1999).
126 35 USC §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994 & Supp IV 1998).

27

1 1Id at 2207.
128See id.
129

Id.
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the availability of state remedies for patent infringement, which, if
adequate, would belie any suggestion that states were acting unconstitutionally by using their sovereign immunity to deprive individuals of their patent rights without due process of law."'
Because of the lack of findings to support Congress's purported
conclusion that federal legislation was needed to remedy or prevent widespread due process violations by the states, the Court
turned to the congruence and proportionality test. Congress, the
Court maintained, had subjected the states to expansive liability,
yet had done nothing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases
involving arguable constitutional violations (where the state failed
to offer adequate remedies for patent infringement, for example). 3'
The Court concluded that the conduct Congress was attempting
to remedy or prevent was almost entirely constitutional and thus
could not serve as the basis for Section 5-based legislation: "The
statute's apparent and more basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy for patent infringement and to place States on the
same footing as private parties under that regime."' 3 2 Such aims,
while entirely proper, were the province of the Patent Clause of
Article I,133 not Section 5.
As Kimel and Florida Prepaidillustrate, the congruence and proportionality test can best be understood as implementing a judicial
presumption of good lawmaking. The Court will assume, as a general proposition, that there typically is some proportionality between legislative means and ends. Thus, where the Court has no
other good way to identify the legislative end in order to determine
whether it is "legitimate"-whether federal legislation is needed
to enhance or protect constitutional values identified by the
Court-it will examine the operation of the legislation to see if it
achieves some legitimate end.
Florida Prepaidsuggests a second (albeit related) function for the
congruence and proportionality test. It is difficult to read the case
without being struck by the apparent incongruity of treating the
Patent Remedy Act as Section 5-based legislation. As its name
suggests, the Patent Remedy Act is first and foremost a patent law
'3

See id at 2209.

131See id at 2210.
132

Id at 2211.
...
US Const, Art I, § 8, cl3.
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and, as such, sensibly should be based on Congress's power under
the Patent Clause. In the post-Seminole Tribe world, however,
Congress could provide a patent infringement remedy against nonconsenting states only if the Act could be shoehorned into a Section 5 framework. Thus, in Florida Prepaidwe see the congruence
and proportionality test with a twist: The question remains
whether the congressional end is legitimate, but the emphasis now
is on whether the end is legitimate for the purposes of Section 5.
The argument for allowing Congress to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under Section 5 but not under Article I rests on the
notion that it makes little sense to say that the Eleventh Amendment bars Congress from restricting state sovereignty when the
Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
' 134
"themselves embody significant limitations on state authority."
Thus, while Congress's ability to legislate under its Article I powers is inherently limited by the Eleventh Amendment, the reverse
is true for Section 5-based legislation: "[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies are
necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 13. If the basic premise of this argument
is sound, it follows that Congress is authorized to abrogate state
sovereign immunity only when it legislates with a rationally defensible purpose of effectuating one of the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibitions on state action. The Court's application of the congruence and proportionality test in Florida Prepaid suggests that
the Court is not willing to permit Congress to circumvent this
limitation simply by dressing Article I-based legislation in Section
5 garb. Rather, when it appears that Congress did not in fact have
a legitimate Section 5 objective in mind when enacting the legislation in question-when it was driven by concerns about commerce
rather than concerns about equality, for example-the Court will
ask whether the means Congress has chosen are congruent and
proportional to the prevention or remediation of an arguably constitutional injury as opposed to a merely commercial one. If the
answer is no, the Court will reject Congress's attempt to abrogate
state sovereign immunity.
"' Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 456 (1976).
135Id.
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Even as an inquiry of sorts into the legitimacy of Congress's legislative ends, the congruence and proportionality test should not
be cause for great concern. Congress's conclusions regarding
"'whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of
36
the Fourteenth Amendment... are entitled to much deference.' 1
Deference, however, is premised on the assumption that Congress
has in fact identified a problem within the realm of constitutional
concern and has devoted its unique lawmaking expertise to crafting
an appropriate response to the problem. That assumption will not
always hold true. Indeed, the Court's recent Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence creates powerful incentives for Congress to find a Section 5 footing for legislation that was inspired by patently extraFourteenth Amendment concerns. Accordingly, the congruence and
proportionality test may have an important role to play in ensuring
that Section 5-based legislation be rationally grounded in such concerns rather than Article I legislation in disguise. It is equally important, however, that the test retain this limited role.
The congruence and proportionality test thus can play a salutary
role in helping the Court monitor the state-federal balance, but
only if the test is confined to settings where Congress either does
not make clear it is invoking Section 5 authority or where the gap
between what the legislation provides and plausible Fourteenth
Amendment concerns suggests that the statute is not in fact animated by such concerns. As we shall see below, if the test is allowed to stray from its original purpose of ensuring that the object
of Section 5 legislation is the prevention or remediation of constitutional violations, to an ill-defined inquiry into the appropriateness of Congress's legislative means, the promise of Section 5 as
an alternative foundation for national civil rights protection soon
will be lost.
II.

REVISITING UNITED STATES V MORRISON

In the preceding part we argued that Congress has broad
power under Section 5 to effectuate the rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 is no different from other enforcement powers, such as Congress enjoys under Article I; under
136City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 536 (1997) (quoting Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US

641, 651 (1966)).
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the McCulloch standard, Congress is owed substantial deference as
to both its identification of ends and its choice of means. But we
recognize that this deference-at least as to ends-must have limits. Congress has no power to define for itself the bounds of the
constitutional provisions it enforces; this remains the exclusive
province of the judiciary. Accordingly, we proposed an additional
limit to Congress's power under Section 5: While Congress is not
limited simply to codifying those prohibitions the Fourteenth
Amendment erects of its own force, it can act only in areas of
constitutional concern identified by the Court.
All government classifications are subject to equal protection
challenge in court at least for scrutiny as to their "rational basis." 37
A reading of Section 5 authority that gives Congress "authority
' simply
...in the premises" 138
because the classification would be
subject to rational basis scrutiny by a court would indeed endow
Congress with the ability to federalize all law and thus threaten
the federal-state balance. The only way to avoid this difficulty
while still according the national legislature ample latitude to address national problems in the social arena-other than reviving
disingenuous readings of the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to reach such issues-is to limit Section 5 authority to those
areas the Court has identified (or is prepared to identify) as implicating the constitutional values that inhere in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
With this conception of Section 5 authority in mind, we now
address the Court's decision in Morrison, holding that the civil
enforcement provision of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) 139 exceeds Congress's power under Section 5. Morrison
rests on two fundamental mistakes: first, its reading of the "state
action" limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment as it bears on
congressional enforcement authority, and second, its application
of the congruence and proportionality test to assess the propriety
of Congress's choice of legislative means.
137As we demonstrate below in the context of disability discrimination, see Part III, while
the fact that a government classification is subject to "rational basis" scrutiny is not, by
itself, a sufficient predicate for Section 5 authority, not all classifications warranting only
rational basis review when challenged in the courts fall outside of the purview of appropriate
Section 5 legislation.
38The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, 34 (1883) (Harlan dissenting).

13942 USC § 13981.
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STATE ACTION

A.

The first, and most obvious, objection to VAWA is that it is
addressed to purely private conduct. Because it is well settled that
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits only state action"14°-and therefore "does not ... add anything to the rights
14
which one citizen has under the Constitution against another" '
it appears at first blush that Congress has no power under Section
5 of the Amendment to reach private conduct. 142 This could mean
one of two things, however. First, it could mean that the object of
Section 5-based legislation cannot be the remediation or prevention of a purely private wrong. On this reading, the state action
limitation contained in Section 1 translates into an ends-based limitation on Congress's power under Section 5. Simply put, private
actors cannot, themselves, violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, if Section 5 authorizes Congress to remedy or prevent constitutional violations, and if the Fourteenth Amendment is violated
only by state action, then Congress has no power to premise Section 5-based legislation purely on the actions of private individuals. Because private wrongs are "evils not comprehended by the
[Fourteenth] Amendment," 14 targeting such evils is not a legitimate legislative goal. s"
Second, the state action limitation in Section 1 could be underUnited States v Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740, 1756 (2000).
States v Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 554-55 (1875); Shelley v Kraemer, 334 US 1,
13 (1948) ("[T]he principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the
action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as
may fairly be said to be that of the States. That amendment erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.").
42See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Private Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, 33
Loyola L Rev 1351, 1359 (2000) (recounting common argument that, "because Section 5
merely authorizes Congress to 'enforce' Section 1, and Section 1 merely proscribes state
conduct, Congress's Section 5 power is limited to directly proscribing state conduct").
143South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 326 (1966).
4Professor Sager has advocated a similar ends-based reading of the state action requirement of Section 1. See Lawrence G. Sager, A Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the
MissingArgument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75 NYU L Rev 150, 153-54 (2000). As Professor
Sager correctly points out, a means-based understanding of the state action limitation such
as that discussed below, see text accompanying note 145, applies the limitation not once,
but twice (that is, to both the ends and the means of Section 5-based legislation). We
break rank with Professor Sager in that we identify as the constitutional wrong VAWA
permissibly could redress current state action denying the victims of gender motivated violence equal treatment in the criminal justice system, while he focuses primarily on historical
discrimination against women.
'0

141United
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stood to create a corresponding limitation on the means Congress
permissibly may employ to achieve its legitimate ends. Therefore,
because Section 1 prohibits only state action, Congress's power
under Section 5 to "enforce" Section 1 is limited to proscribing
state action. This reading was adopted by the Fourth Circuit in
the Morrison litigation, where it reasoned that, "because Section 1
provides only rights against the States . .. Section 5 only grants
Congress power to enforce the rights provided in Section 1
through legislation directed against state action, not a power to
regulate purely private conduct."' 4 5
The constitutionality of VAWA turns on which of these competing understandings of the state action limitation is correct.
Congress enacted VAWA in the face of evidence of widespread
bias in state criminal and civil justice systems against the victims
of gender-motivated violence; the purpose of the Act was to remedy the effects of such state bias so as to ensure practical enjoyment
of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. In
order to effectuate this goal, Congress created a private right of
action for women victimized by gender-motivated violence. Rather
than subject themselves to discriminatory treatment at the hands
of state officials, women could sue their attackers in federal court
and recover compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. 146 Thus, if the state action requirement
of Section 1 means simply that Section 5-based legislation must
have as its object the prevention or remediation of unconstitutional
state action, then VAWA easily passes constitutional muster. If,
however, the state action limitation applies not only to legislative
ends, but also to the means Congress adopts to achieve those ends,
then VAWA must fall: Although Congress's goal was to remedy
gender-based discriminatory treatment by state officials, VAWA's
civil remedy operated directly upon private actors-the perpetrators of gender-motivated violence against women.
The Court in Morrison began its analysis by noting the "voluminous congressional record" containing evidence that "many
participants in state justice systems are perpetuating an array of
erroneous stereotypes and assumptions" that "often result in in145Brzonkala v Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F3d 820, 865 (4th Cir 1999), aff'd
as United States v Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740 (2000).
1-42 USC § 13981.
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sufficient investigation and prosecution of gender-motivated crime,
inappropriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims
of that crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for those
47
who are actually convicted of gender-motivated violence."' The
Court did not dispute Congress's determination that such "statesponsored gender discrimination" could violate the Equal Protection Clause. 48 Instead, it went on to emphasize that "the language
and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment place certain limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory
conduct," foremost among which is the "state action" requirement
of Section 1.149
From the perspective of the first, ends-based reading of the state
action limitation discussed above, this is a non sequitur. On this
reading, the appropriate question is whether the object of Section
5-based legislation is unconstitutional state action. The Court
conceded that VAWA satisfied this requirement: It questioned neither the accuracy of Congress's findings of pervasive bias in state
criminal and civil justice systems, nor the validity of Congress's
conclusion that discriminatory treatment based on such bias is unconstitutional unless supported by, and substantially related to, an
important state interest. 5 ° But, for the Morrison Court, the undisputed fact that Congress's legislative end was a legitimate one did
not end the inquiry, for, in its view, the state action requirement
also speaks to the manner in which Congress may permissibly act.
To support its acceptance of the second, means-based reading
of the state action limitation, the Court relied on United States
52
v Harris,'' and the Civil Rights Cases,' two nineteenth-century
decisions striking down antidiscrimination legislation as beyond
Congress's Section 5 power.'53 However, it is far from clear that
47Morrison, 120 S Ct at 1755.
148Id.
hO

Id at 1755-56.
See id at 1755.

151106 US 629 (1883).
152 109 US 3 (1883).
" The continued validity of Harris and the Civil Rights Cases is open to question. Writing
for the majority in Boerne, Justice Kennedy conceded that the holdings in the Civil Rights
Cases and other early cases limiting Congress's power under Section 5 "had been superseded
or modified." City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 525 (1997). In Morrison, the government
argued (unsuccessfully) that Harris and the Civil Rights Cases were effectively overruled by
the Court's subsequent decisions in United States v Guest, 383 US 745 (1966), and District
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either of these cases supports the conclusion that Congress may
not target private conduct as a means to remedy or prevent unconstitutional state action.
In Harris,the Court struck down Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1871,154 which sought to punish private persons for "conspiring to deprive any one of the equal protection of the laws enacted by the State."' 55 The Court concluded that the law exceeded
Congress's power under Section 5 because it was "directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to
the laws of the State, or their administration by her officers."' 156
But the Court emphasized that the primary problem with Section
2 was one of ends, not means:
When the state has been guilty of no violation of [the Fourteenth Amendment's] provisions, when it has not made or enforced any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; when no one of its departments has
deprived any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or denied to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws; when, on the contrary, the
laws of the state, as enacted by its legislative, and construed
by its judicial, and administered by its executive departments,
recognized and protect the rights of all persons, the amendment imposes no duty and confers no power upon congress.'57
This language is entirely consistent with the ends-based reading
of the state action limitation. As explained in Part I, when assessing
the validity of Section 5-based legislation, the question for the
Court is whether the "injury to be prevented or remedied"' 8 is
one properly understood as residing within the constitutional provision in question. In other words, a necessary prerequisite for congressional power under Section 5 is the existence of a wrong conof Columbia v Carter, 409 US 418 (1973). See Morrison, 120 S Ct at 1756-58. Commentators
likewise have questioned the appropriateness of "extract[ing] an account of the national
government's powers from cases decided in 1883 and mechanically apply[ing] it to a federal
civil rights statute enacted more than one hundred years later." Post and Siegel at 485
(cited in note 4). Post and Siegel argue persuasively that changes in our understanding of
the role of the federal government in effecting civil rights guarantees suggest that Harris
and the Civil Rights Cases are best understood as relics of a bygone era.
14Act of April 20, 1861, § 2, 17 Stat 13.
"'Harris, 106 US at 639.
56Id at 640.
'5'Id

at 639.
Boerne, 521 US at 520.
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templated by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harris
makes clear that only wrongs committed by the states or their
agents can satisfy this requirement: Because the Fourteenth
Amendment does not address purely private wrongs, the "injury"
of private discrimination, unsupported by state action, cannot be
said to fall within the scope of the amendment, and hence standing
alone gives Congress no warrant to act to prevent or remedy such
private wrongs.
The Court reiterated this point in the Civil Rights Cases, where
it struck down the public accommodation provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875,159 which prohibited private discrimination
against former slaves in "the enjoyment of the accommodations
and privileges of inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other
places of public amusement."16 The Court began by noting that
Section 1 "is prohibitory in character, and prohibitory upon the
'
Thus, the Court reasoned, the power of Congress to
states." 161
"enforce" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment means the
power "[t]o adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects
of such prohibited state law and state acts, and thus to render them
effectively null, void, and innocuous." 162 Accordingly, valid Section
5-based legislation "must necessarily be predicated upon such [unconstitutional] state laws or state proceedings, and be directed to
the correction of their operation and effect."' 63 As in Harris, the
Court in the Civil Rights Cases focused on the legitimacy of Congress's legislative ends, holding that, "until some state law has been
passed, or some state action through its officers or agents has been
taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by
the fourteenth amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation,
can be called into activity." 164
Both cases, therefore, stand for the limited proposition that
"civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the constitution against
state aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of indi159

Act of March 1, 1875, 18 Stat 335.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, 10 (1883).
161Id.
162
1Id at 11.
160The

61
1 Id

at 11-12.

114Id at 13.
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viduals, unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings."' 65 As such, while supporting the ends-based reading of the state action limitation, these
decisions provide no basis for the conclusion that Congress lacks
the power to legislate against private conduct as a means to remedy
or prevent unconstitutional state action. This point did not escape
VAWA's supporters, who argued in Morrison that Harris and the
Civil Rights Cases could be distinguished on the ground that Congress had ample evidence of gender-based disparate treatment by
state authorities, whereas there was no indication in either Harris
or the Civil Rights Cases of such state action.166
The Court rejected this argument in a rather remarkable fashion: It reasoned that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts
of 1871 and 1875 disclosed that the Congresses that enacted those
laws were driven by similar concerns about discriminatory enforcement of state laws protecting the newly freed slaves. 167 One can
search the opinions in Harris and the Civil Rights Cases in vain,
however, for any mention of such discriminatory action on the part
of state officials. Not only did the Court in those cases decline to
reach the question whether congressional findings of unconstitutional state action could support legislation targeting private conduct, there is no hint in either case that the Court was even aware
of the historical evidence cited in Morrison.
It is a well settled, if frequently ignored, rule of stare decisis
that the Court will not consider itself bound by dicta in previous
decisions. Indeed, the Court paid homage to this rule in Morrison,
rejecting the government's argument that the validity of both Harris and the Civil Rights Cases had been called into question by dicta
in subsequent cases.168 Nevertheless, in concluding that Harrisand
the Civil Rights Cases support a limitation on Congress's power well
beyond what their holdings require, the Morrison Court relied, not
65

1d
I at 17.
See United States v Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740, 1758 (2000).
167See id. The Fourth Circuit likewise engaged in an extensive description of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 and 1875, concluding that the Reconstruction
Congress was trying to "remedy" failures in state enforcement of the rights of African
Americans. See Brzonkala v Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F3d 820, 871 (4th Cir
1999), aff'd as United States v Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740 (2000).
16 See Morrison, 120 S Ct at 1757 ("[Imt would take more than naked dicta ...
to cast
any doubt upon the enduring validity of the Civil Rights Cases and Harris."); note 153.
66
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merely on what the Court said in dicta in those earlier decisions,
but on what the Court in 1883 presumably would have said had it
considered an issue it apparently ignored. We are unaware of any
other instance in which a court has gone to such lengths to derive
controlling meaning from the presumed, yet unspoken, premises
of century-old precedent.
If neither Harrisnor the Civil Rights Cases compels us to adopt
the means-based reading of the state action requirement, is there
any other reason we should prefer that reading to one that requires
only that state action be the object of Section 5-based legislation?
One could argue that a state action limitation on the means Congress employs to accomplish its legitimate ends-the prevention
or remediation of unconstitutional state action-is implied by the
word "enforce" in Section 5.169 "Enforce," the argument goes,
means to "compel obedience to."17 Section 5-based legislation
therefore is not "appropriate" unless it will tend to compel state
actors to obey the prohibitions set forth in Section 1. Because legislation that targets only private actors presumably will not lead
state actors to conform their conduct to the requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause, this understanding of "enforce" suggests
that Congress can never reach purely private conduct under Section 5.
There are two obvious problems with this argument. The first
is that the Court has never adopted such a cramped reading of
Congress's power to "enforce" the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court's repeated references to Congress's power
to "remedy" or "prevent" constitutional violations'7 1 itself suggests
that "enforce" must mean something more than "compel submission to." If one assumes that the Court has not simply been engaging in an exercise in redundancy, it follows that "some measures
that redress but do not prevent unconstitutional state action must
See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Antonio J. Morrison at 36-37, Morrison (Nos 99-5,
99-29).
170See id at 36 (quoting Random House Unabridged Dictionary 644 (2d ed 1993)).
16'

See, e.g., Kimel v Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S Ct 631, 644 (2000) (referring to Congress's
"authority both to remedy and to deter violations of [constitutional] rights"); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v College Savings Bank, 119 S Ct 2199, 2207 (1999) (holding
that Congress must tailor remedial scheme to remedying or preventing unconstitutional
conduct); City ofBoerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 524 (1997) (discussing "remedial and preventative nature of Congress's enforcement power").

150

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2000

'enforce' Section 1 provisions, undermining the claim that prevention is the sine qua non of 'enforcement.' "172
Moreover, even in the Civil Rights Cases-seldom viewed as the
Court's most expansive moment with regard to the power of the
federal government to effectuate the guarantees of the Reconstruction Amendments-the Court embraced an understanding of
Congress's enforcement power that reached beyond the authority
to force state actors to comply with the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that Section 5's grant of
power to Congress to "enforce" the amendment meant that Congress could enact legislation to "correct[] the effects" of state actions prohibited by Section 1.173 As VAWA illustrates, Congress
can act to redress the ill effects of unconstitutional state action
without directly and explicitly compelling state actors to obey the
strictures of the Constitution: The private right of action it creates
allows the victims of gender-motivated bias to obtain legal redress
against their attackers without subjecting themselves to discriminatory state justice systems.
VAWA likewise illustrates the second problem with the argument that Congress can never "compel obedience to" the Fourteenth Amendment by legislating against private conduct. VAWA's
enactment was well publicized, 17 4 drawing media and public attention not only to the problem of gender-motivated violence against
women, but also to the widespread bias in state criminal and civil
justice systems that gave rise to the need for federal legislation.
Such legislation can help "enforce" gender-neutral administration of
state laws by changing the legal culture to one more receptive to claims
of gender-based violence, much as the Civil Rights Act of 1964
changed the legal culture surrounding the acceptability of race discrimination in employment and public accommodations, even before
Congress applied the law to state and local governments.175
72Caminker at 1360 (cited in note 142).

17'The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, 11 (1883). See also text accompanying note 162.
'7' See, e.g., Michael Kranish, Crime Bill Is Approved in Senate, Boston Globe (Aug 24,
1994), at Al; Michael Ross, House OK's Crime Bill, LA Times (Aug 22, 1994), at 1; Robert
Shepard, Female Agenda Takes Long Way to Become Law, Chi Trib (Sept 25, 1994), at 1;
George F. Will, Touchy-Feely Crime Bill, Wash Post (July 14, 1994), at A23.
17'Though not presented by the situation addressed by VAWA, private violence can also
effectively hamstring the efforts of state governments to meet their obligations under the
Fourteenth Amendment to, say, desegregate schools or other institutions. Even if the state
is not acting in collusion with the private parties, and thus state action cannot be found,
legislation visiting criminal and other sanctions on the perpetrators of such violence would
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We have seen that neither precedent nor text compels acceptance of the means-based reading of the state action limitation.
This alone should be enough to suggest that the alternate, endsbased reading is appropriate, for as a general matter courts willand should-refrain from setting limitations, not grounded in the
Constitution, on Congress's ability to perform its constitutionally
designated responsibilities. However, we have additional reason to
prefer the ends-based understanding of the state action limitation.
The Court in recent years has expressed considerable concern
about preserving the balance of federal-state power.176 Considerations of federalism are furthered by federal legislation that secures
civil rights guarantees for citizens while intruding as little as possible on the sovereign powers of the states. VAWA did just that:
Rather than acting directly on state actors such as prosecutors,
judges, policemen, and caseworkers, Congress devised a way to
help women overcome the effects of state-sponsored bias by suing
their attackers themselves.
Perhaps recognizing the various deficiencies of the means-based
reading of the state action limitation, the Morrison Court stopped
short of stating that Congress can never target private conduct as a
means to remedy or prevent unconstitutional state action. Instead,
putting to the side the state action question, the Court turned to
the congruence and proportionality test to determine whether
VAWA's civil remedy was appropriately remedial or preventative
in character.
B.

MORRISON'S APPLICATION OF THE CONGRUENCE
AND PROPORTIONALITY TEST

The Morrison Court's application of the congruence and proportionality test is at best puzzling. The Court introduced the test in
Boerne-and applied it in Kime 77 and Florida Prepaid1T-as a way
to assess whether the object of Section 5-based legislation is legitimate. In other words, the congruence and proportionality test
speaks to the question of power in the premises: Is this an issue
represent an effort to "enforce" Fourteenth Amendment obligations and values. See Archi-

bald Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations, 40 U Cin L Rev 199 (1971).
76 See note 99.

177See notes 111-24 and accompanying text.
178See notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
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with regard to which Congress is authorized to act? Understood
this way, the congruence and proportionality test is consistent with
the Court's traditional deference to Congress under the McCulloch
standard, pursuant to which Congress is afforded substantial discretion both in its identification of legislative ends and in its choice
of the means by which to carry out those ends. Though it is the
prerogative of Congress to decide, in the first instance, whether
national legislation is needed, concern for maintaining the proper
balance between state and federal power suggests that the Court
may properly play a role in policing the bounds of Congress's authority.17 9 As we explained above, 8 ' the congruence and proportionality test allows the Court to engage in this sort of oversight
when it is unclear that Congress independently investigated the
issue in question to determine that an injury of constitutional proportion existed such that federal intrusion into the traditional prerogatives of the states was appropriate. By looking at what Congress has done so as to discern what Congress intended to do, the
test helps the Court assess whether the object of Section 5-based
legislation is "to prevent and remedy constitutional violations.""'
It is difficult, however, to understand Morrison in these terms.
The Court did not dispute that gender-based disparate treatment
by state authorities constitutes the sort of equal protection violation that Congress may properly address under Section 5.18 Nor
did the Court question the accuracy of Congress's findings-well
detailed in the "voluminous"' 8 3 legislative record-that such disparate treatment was commonplace in state criminal and civil justice
systems. Accordingly, Morrison was precisely the sort of case in
which the congruence and proportionality test is unnecessary and
inappropriate. The object of VAWA was clear: The "injury to be
prevented or remedied" 18 4 was that of being subjected to biased
and discriminatory treatment at the hands of the state authorities
responsible for administering state laws proscribing violence.
Moreover, as the Court itself conceded, that injury fit quite com179But see note 3.

...
See Part I.C.
' City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 535 (1997).
182See United States v Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740, 1755 (2000).
183Id.

"8Boerne,521 US at 520.
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fortably within the recognized zone of equal protection concern.
Thus, the initial question for the Court when it is called upon to
determine the legitimacy of Section 5-based legislation-what is
"the Fourteenth Amendment 'evil' or 'wrong' that Congress intended to remedy[?]"1'-could be answered quite easily. Congress
plainly had identified the evil, and the Court had no need to use
the congruence and proportionality test as a way to infer congressional intent on that issue.
The use of the congruence and proportionality test in Morrison
is puzzling precisely because it diverges so starkly from the Court's
earlier explanations and applications of the test. Instead of using
the congruence and proportionality test to identify the object of
Section 5-based legislation where congressional intent is unclear-an exercise in superfluity, given the clarity (not to mention
girth) of VAWA's legislative record-the Court proceeded on the
assumption that the goal of VAWA was a legitimate one, and applied the test to evaluate the means Congress had adopted to
achieve that goal."8 6 Used in this fashion, the congruence and proportionality test is quite problematic.
As an initial matter, it bears mention that the test provides scant
guidance for either Congress or lower courts as to the degree of
congruence and proportionality required between legislative ends
and means. But the indeterminate nature of the congruence and
proportionality test is not its most serious failing. More fundamentally, the test is at odds with the long-standing principle that courts
are not-and should not be-in the business of second-guessing
Congress's reasoned judgment regarding how best to implement
its valid legislative goals. That principle is no less applicable to
Section 5-based legislation than to legislation enacted pursuant to
Congress's Article I powers.
The history of the Fourteenth Amendment has been subject to
exhaustive treatment elsewhere, i"7 and we will not recount it in
"85Fla. PrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd. v College Savings Bank, 119 S Ct 2199, 2207
(1999).
"86See Morrison, 120 S Ct at 1758.
117 See, e.g., Horace E. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment (1908); Joseph B.
James, The Framingof the Fourteenth Amendment (1956); William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth
Amendment: From PoliticalPrinciple to Judicial Doctrine (1988); Jacobus TenBroek, The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment (1951); Michael P. Zuckert, CongressionalPower
Under the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understandingof Section Five, 3 Const Commentary 103 (1986).
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detail here. The crucial point for the purposes of the present discussion is that it was widely understood-at the framing of the
amendment, and by the Court in its earliest interpretations of itthat the word "appropriate" in Section 5 was meant to invoke the
necessary and proper standard set forth in McCulloch, and therefore
to apply to Section 5-based legislation the tradition of legislative
discretion and judicial deference recognized under that standard.
The original draft of the Fourteenth Amendment made this explicit, echoing the text of Article I, Section 8:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states, and to all persons
in the several states equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.'88
The proposal met with substantial opposition, much of which,
as the Boerne Court noted, focused on the fact that "[t]he proposed
Amendment gave Congress too much legislative power at the expense of the existing constitutional structure."' 89 Behind this general complaint, however, lay a wide variety of more specific critiques. For example, some expressed concern that the proposed
language would grant Congress uncabined power to enact legislation concerning any matter touching on life, liberty, or property,
and so would upset the balance of federalism. 9 ° Others worried
that the equal protection language of the proposed amendment
would vest Congress with the power to pass legislation equalizing
laws among the states."' Still others complained that the proposal
relied too heavily on Congress as the sole protector of constitutional rights.'92
As a result of these critiques, a second version of the amendment
was proposed. The new proposal contained several important
changes. First, the newly minted Section 1 made the provisions of
the amendment self-executing and limited to prohibiting only state
"I Cong Globe, 39th Cong, ist Sess, 1034 (1866).
189Boerne, 521 US at 520 (citing legislative record).
"9See, e.g., Steven A. Engel, Note: The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment:
City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 Yale L J 115, 125
(1999).
...
See id.
192See id at 125-26.
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action. Second, Section 5 now read: "The Congress shall have the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
'
As such, it tracked the language of the Enforcement
article."193
Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment. 19 4 Accordingly, any suggestion that the change from "necessary and proper" to "appropriate"
signaled a constriction of Congress's enforcement power under
Section 5 must contend with the settled view that Congress chose
the word "appropriate" in the Thirteenth Amendment with the
McCulloch standard in mind. 9 Moreover, from its first explication
of Congress's Section 5 power in Ex Parte Virginia, the Court has
reasoned that the grant of power to Congress to enact "appropriate legislation" suggested that Congress enjoyed the same broad
discretion under Section 5 as under the McCulloch standard.196 The
link between the McCulloch necessary and proper standard and Section 5 was cemented in Morgan, where the Court stated that, "[b]y
including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant Congress, by a specific
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same
19 7
broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause."
The McCulloch standard requires courts to refrain from substituting their judgment for Congress's as to how to effectuate legislative goals:
Congress must have a wide discretion as to the choice of
means; and the only limitation upon the discretion would seem
to be, that the means are appropriate to the end. And this must
admit of considerable latitude; for the relation between the action and the end . . . is not always so direct and palpable as
to strike the eye of every observer.'9 "
Such deference to Congress's choice of means is grounded in the
principle of separation of powers. For if the end is legitimate, Con1 Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess, 2286 (1866).
Const, Amend XIII, Section 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.").
"IsSee, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv L Rev 747, 823 -26 (1999); Engel
at 131 & n 76 (cited in note 190). See also Jones v Alfred Mayer Co., 392 US 409, 439
(1968) (recognizing that enforcement clause of Thirteenth Amendment "clothed 'Congress
with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States"' (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, 20 (1883))).
96See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US 339, 345-46 (1879). See also text accompanying note
29 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US at 345-46).
"' Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641, 650 (1966).
"'Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 417 (1883).
194US
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gress is in a far better institutional position than the judiciary to
craft appropriate means to accomplish that objective.
The Morrison Court attempted to bring its analysis of VAWA
into line with this principle by suggesting that VAWA's private
remedy was obviously different from the legislation upheld in previous cases.199 If this were correct, then the Court's invocation of
the congruence and proportionality test would be significantly less
startling: It would simply reflect a different nomenclature for traditional deferential rational basis scrutiny of congressional enactments. But VAWA was not, in fact, so easily distinguishable from
previous remedial legislation as the Court implied. For example,
the Court complained that VAWA's civil remedy "applies uniformly throughout the nation."200 But so did the prohibition on
literacy tests unanimously upheld in Oregon v Mitchell.2"' Similarly, though Congress did not gather evidence of discrimination
against the victims of gender-motivated crimes in each and every
state," 2 the absence of "state-by-state findings" did not trouble the
Court in Mitchell. Indeed, Justice Stewart made clear in that case
that the justification for a nationwide remedy "need not turn on"
whether a constitutional violation could be found in every state,
as Congress "may paint in a much broader brush than may this

'" See Morrison, 120 S Ct at 1758-59.
2

°°Id at 1759.

201400 US 112, 131-34 (1970). The Mitchell Court upheld the prohibition as an exercise

of Congress's power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. See id at 132; id at 216
(Harlan concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 235-36 (Brennan, White, and
Marshall concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 282 (Stewart concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The Court has long interpreted Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as coextensive with the parallel enforcement provision of Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641, 651 (1966) (noting similarity
between Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
22 See Morrison, 120 S Ct at 1759. It is worth noting, moreover, that, contrary to the
Court's assertion that "Congress' findings indicate that the problem of discrimination
against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even most
states," the legislative record included, among other things, a letter signed by thirty-eight
State Attorneys General supporting VAWA on the ground that "the problem of violence
against women is a national one, requiring federal attention." Letter from Robert Abrams,
Attorney General of New York, et al, to Jack Brooks, Chair, House Judiciary Committee
(July 22, 1993), reprinted in Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: HearingBefore Subcomm.
on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong, 34-36
(1993). Moreover, as Justice Breyer noted in dissent, Congress also "had before it the task
force reports of at least 21 States documenting constitutional violations. And it made its
own findings about pervasive gender-based stereotypes hampering many state legal systems,
sometimes unconstitutionally so." Morrison, 120 S Ct 1779 (Breyer dissenting).
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Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of decid2 °3
ing individual cases and controversies upon individual records."
There is, however, one way in which VAWA differed from other
remedial legislation: its penalties were directed against private individuals who committed crimes motivated by gender bias. The
Court seized on this factor, suggesting that although neither the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Court's precedents interpreting Section 5 mandated a means-based reading of the state
action limitation, the congruence and proportionality test did.
VAWA, the Court explained, "visits no consequence whatsoever
on any Virginia public official involved in investigating or prosecuting [plaintiff's] assault." 2°4 In the Court's view, this alone distinguished VAWA's civil remedy from the Section 5-based legislation upheld in Morgan and South Carolina, thus exposing the Act's
lack of congruence and proportionality.2 5°
It is hard to understand this argument as anything other than
a flat rejection of Congress's judgment as to how best to effectuate
its goals. Recall that the Court had declined to hold that the state
action requirement of Section 1 sets limits on the means Congress
may permissibly employ to achieve its legislative goals.2" 6 Instead,
it proceeded on the assumption that VAWA was appropriately
premised on unconstitutional conduct by state officials. Thus, the
Court turned to the congruence and proportionality test on the
premise that neither Harris nor the Civil Rights Cases compelled
the conclusion that VAWA was invalid because it failed to satisfy
the state action requirement. If we take the Court at its word (as
presumably we must), the problem with VAWA's civil remedy was
not a state action problem, but rather a lack of sufficiently narrow
tailoring between legislative ends and means. It is far from obvious,
however, that this is a necessary or even reasonable conclusion. As
Justice Breyer noted in dissent:
[W]hy can Congress not provide a remedy against private
actors? Those private actors, of course, did not themselves violate the Constitution. But this Court has held that Congress
at least sometimes can enact remedial "[legislation . . . [that]
203Mitchell, 400 US at 284 (Stewart concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2

04Morrison,

205See id.
206 See

id.

120 S Ct at 1758.
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prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional.".. .The
statutory remedy ...

intrudes little upon either States or pri-

vate parties. It may lead state actors to improve their own remedial systems, primarily through example. It restricts private
actors only by imposing liability for private conduct that is, in
the main, already forbidden by state law. Why is the remedy
"disproportionate"? And given the relation between remedy
and violation-the creation of a federal remedy to substitute
for constitutionally inadequate state remedies-where is the
lack of "congruence"?2 °7
The fact that reasonable minds can disagree over whether the
means Congress has chosen to achieve its goal will in fact be successful should itself put an end to the inquiry. If deference means
anything-if the "presumption of constitutionality"2 °8 is not
merely a phrase courts invoke out of politeness but ignore in
fact-it means that courts must respect the institutional division
of labor the Constitution creates. It is Congress's job to make law,
to make difficult and complex judgments about when legislation
is needed and what form it should take. When the Court agrees
that Congress has acted within the bounds of its enumerated powers-that the end is legitimate, and that the means chosen plausibly are directed to achieving that end-the Court should sustain
the law, whether grounded on Congress's Section 5 power or Article I.
III.

ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION AFTER MORRISON:

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Morrison is troubling, not just for its rejection of the Violence Against Women Act, but for its implications for other antidiscrimination legislation. Until recently, such legislation has
rested comfortably within the aegis of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. However, the Court's recent decisions holding
that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5, but not under Article I,2"9 have created powerful incentives
207Id at 1779 (Breyer dissenting).
200Id at 1748. See also id ("Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of
government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.").
200See notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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federal antidiscrimination statutes as Section
to test the validity of
21 °
5-based legislation.
In this Part, we demonstrate how the theoretical framework we
have proposed for analyzing Section 5-based legislation can be applied to such antidiscrimination statutes. We use as our model Titles 1211 and I1212 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).213
210See, e.g., Holman v Indiana, 211 F3d 399 (7th Cir 1999) (challenging Tide VII); In

re Employment DiscriminationLitig., 198 F3d 1305 (11 th Cir 1999) (challenging Tide VII);
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. ofAla. v Garrett, 193 F3d 1214 (11th Cir 1999), cert granted in
part, 120 S Ct 1669 (2000) (challenging ADA); Fitzmater v FirstJudicial Districtof Pa., No
Civ A 99-3274, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 4931 (ED Pa April 11, 2000) (challenging Tide VII);
Sandoval v Hogan, 197 F3d 484 (lth Cir 1999) (challenging Tide VI); Lesage v Texas, 158
F3d 213 (5th Cir 1998) (challenging Tide VI); Litman v George Mason Univ., 186 F3d 544
(4th Cir 1999) (challenging Tide IX), cert denied, 120 S Ct 1220 (2000).
21142 USC §§ 12111 -12117 (1994 & Supp IV 1998). Title I of the ADA targets discrimination by employers, including state and local governments. Id §§ 12111(2), (5)(A), (7). It
provides that "no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id § 12112(a). "Discriminate"
is defined to include "limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in
a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because
of [a] disability," as well as the use of employment criteria that "screen out or tend to
screen out" persons with disabilities, unless the criteria are "job related for the position in
question and [are] consistent with business necessity." Id §§ 12112(b)(1), (b)(6). Unlawful discrimination also includes the failure to make "reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,"
unless the accommodation "would impose an undue hardship" on the employer.
Id § 12112(b)(5)(A). A "qualified individual with a disability" is a person who "can
perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation." Id
§ 12111(8).
212Title II of the ADA addresses discrimination by governmental entities in the operation
of public services, programs, and activities, including transportation. Id §§ 12131-12165.
It prohibits "public entities"-defined to include "any State or local government and its
components," id § 1213 1(1)(A)-(B)-from discriminating against or excluding "qualified individual[s]" from participation in or enjoyment of the benefits of its services, programs, or
activities "by reason of" their disability. Id §12132. Under Tide II, a "qualified individual
with a disability" is a person "who, with or without reasonable modifications ... meets
the essential eligibility requirements" for the governmental program or service, including
employment. Id § 12131(2); 28 CFR 35.140. Tide H normally does not require a public
entity to make its existing physical facilities accessible, although alterations of those facilities
and any new facilities must be made accessible. See 28 CFR 35.150(a)(1), 35.151. With the
exception of new construction and alterations, public entities need not take any steps that
would "result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, activity or
in undue financial and administrative burdens." 28 CFR 35.150(a)(3). See also 28 CFR
35.130(b)(7), 35.164; Olmstead v L.C., 527 US 581, 606 n 16 (1999).
342 USC § 12101 et seq (1994 & Supp IV 1998). The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett, 193 F3d 1214 (11th Cir 1999),
cert granted in part, 120 S Ct 1669 (2000), to determine whether Titles I and II of the
ADA are proper exercises of Congress's Section 5 power. Tide IfI of the Act-which is
not at issue in Garrett-addresses discrimination in public accommodations operated by
private entities. See id §§ 12181-12189. We do not consider Title III because it does not
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In one sense, a Section 5-based challenge to the ADA is entirely
proper. Although the provisions we consider-which prohibit, respectively, disability-based discrimination by employers and by
public entities providing public services-clearly bear some relationship to interstate commerce, it is equally clear that the concern
driving those who passed the Act was not commerce as such, but
equality. Thus, it seems desirable, from the perspective of legislative candor, that such legislation be linked explicitly to Congress's
power to give full effect to the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.
In a different sense, however, the inevitable testing of the ADA
and statutes like it is cause for great concern. Both Titles I and
II of the ADA may be enforced through private suits against governmental entities 1 4 Hence the need to determine whether the
Act can pass muster as a Section 5 enactment: After Seminole Tribe,
Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity only when it acts
pursuant to its Section 5 authority.215 Accordingly, however valid
the ADA may be as an exercise of Congress's commerce power,
without the Section 5 footing Congress could not grant individuals
a federal right of action for damages against nonconsenting states.
Thus, the question whether the ADA and like legislation can be
sustained as an exercise of Congress's Section 5 power is heavily
laden with federalism concerns that threaten to obscure any attempt to discern appropriate and practicable limits on congressional enforcement authority.
The ADA is an appropriate candidate for testing our framework
for another reason as well. The ADA imposes obligations on state
governments that arguably exceed Fourteenth Amendment requirements. The legislation authorizes both disparate impact challenges that the Court has made clear are not available under the
Constitution,216 and an obligation to reasonably accommodate
"qualified individuals with handicaps" that extends the antidisimplicate the state sovereign immunity question and therefore is less likely to be the subject
of a Section 5-based challenge.
24 See 42 USC §§ 12117(a), 12133. Moreover, Congress unequivocally expressed its intent for the ADA to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id § 12202 ("A State shall not be
immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an
action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of [the ADA].").
211Seminole Tribe v Florida, 517 US 44, 55 (1996).
,16See Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976).
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crimination principle considerably further than the Court has ever
been prepared to do, even in race and sex discrimination cases,
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, unlike Morrison, which involved gender discrimination, conduct which the Court has indicated merits a heightened
judicial scrutiny, the ADA involves disability discrimination, a category of conduct that the Court has held warrants only rational
basis review. In City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center,217 the
Court found that the zoning ordinance in question, which required
a special use permit for a home for the mentally disabled but not,
for example, for a boarding house or a hospital, was based on irrational prejudice and so violated the Equal Protection Clause.218 Yet
the Court explicitly rejected the argument that legislative classifications based on mental disability should be subject to anything
other than traditional rational basis review.2 19 At first blush, therefore, Kimel's invalidation of legislation prohibiting age-based discrimination-which, like discrimination against the disabled, is reviewed under the rational basis standard-would seem to signal a
similar fate for the ADA. However, on closer inspection, the differences between the two statutes become clear.
A.

CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS IN

SUPPORT OF THE ADA

Like the Violence Against Women Act, the ADA is supported
by a voluminous legislative record replete with findings of unconstitutional state action. Congress engaged in extensive fact-finding
concerning the problem of discrimination against persons with disabilities, holding thirteen hearings devoted specifically to the consideration of the ADA,22 ° and considering several reports and sur217473

US 432 (1985).
at 448-50.
219Id at 442-46.
218Id

22 See Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing on HR 2273 and S 993 Before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (1990); Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearings on
HR 2273 Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the House Committee
on Public Works and Transportation, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (1990); Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the House Committee on Small Business, 101st Cong, 2d Sess
(1990); Americans with Disabilities Act: Telecommunications Relay Services, Hearing on
Title V of HR 2273 Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (1990); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on HR 2273 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (1989);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on HR 2273 Before the Subcommittee
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veys. 221 In addition, a congressionally designated Task Force held
sixty-three public forums across the country, which were attended
by more than 7,000 individuals.222 The Task Force presented to
Congress evidence submitted by nearly 5,000 individuals documenting the problems with discrimination faced daily by persons
with disabilities-often at the hands of state and local governments.2 23
Moreover, the Congress that enacted the ADA brought to that
legislative process decades of experience studying the scope and
nature of discrimination against persons with disabilities and testing incremental legislative steps to combat that discrimination.
Prior to enacting the ADA, Congress attempted to combat disability discrimination in a number of discrete areas, including architectural barriers to government buildings and courthouses,224 education, 225 transportation, 226 voting,227 and housing. 228 Only after
witnessing the failure of more limited measures did Congress conon Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong, 1st
Sess (1989); Hearing on HR 2273, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities and Select Education of
the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (July 18 & Sept 13,
1989) (two hearings); Oversight Hearing on HR 4498, Americans with Disabilities Act of
1988: Hearing Before the House Committee on Select Education of the House Committee
on Education and Labor, 100th Cong, 2d Sess (1989); Americans with Disabilities Act of
1989: Hearings on S 933 Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
and the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (1989); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on S 2345 Before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcommittee
on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong, 2d
Sess (1989).
221See S Rep No 116, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 6 (1989); HR Rep No 485, 101st Cong, 2d
Sess Pt 2, at 28 (1990); Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with
Disabilities, From ADA to Empowerment 16 (1990) ("Task Force Report").
222
See Task Force Report at 18 (cited in note 221).
223See 2 Staff of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong, 2d Sess,
Legis Hist of Pub L No 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act, 100th Cong, 2d
Sess 1040 (Comm Print 1990); Task Force Report at 16 (cited in note 221).
224See Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 USC 4151 et seq (1994).
221See Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub L No 91-230, Tit VI, 84 Stat 175 (reenacted in 1990 as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 USC 1400 et seq
(1994)).
226See Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970, 49 USC § 1612 (1994); Air Carrier
Access Act of 1986, 49 USC § 41705 (1994).
227See Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, 423 USC § 1973ee-1
(1994).
228See Fair Housing Amendments of 1988, 42 USC § 3604 (1994).
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clude that the ADA's "comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities"
was required.229
Congress found that, "historically, society has tended to isolate
and segregate individuals with disabilities," and that "such forms
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to
be a serious and pervasive social problem."2 3 Specifically, discrimination against persons with disabilities "persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization,
health services, voting, and access to public services." 2 3' Although
most-if not all-states had enacted laws prohibiting discrimination against the disabled, such laws were "inadequate to address
the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabili' Even in the face of state antidiscrimination legisties are facing."232
lation, persons with disabilities:
continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects
of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers,
overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications
to the existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification
standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.233
"The continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice," Congress concluded, "denies people with disopportunities for which our free society is justifiably
abilities the
23 4
famous."
In light of these findings, the Court should have no difficulty
finding that the ADA was animated by a purpose to address and
22942 USC

§ 12101(b)(1).

230Id § 12101(a)(2).
23

Id § 12101(a)(3).

232S Rep No 116 at 18; HR Rep No 485 at 47.
23342 USC § 12101(a)(5). See also id § 12101(a)(7) (finding that people with disabilities
have been "faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypical assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals
to participate in, and contribute to, society").
...
Id § 12101(a)(9).
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remedy disability discrimination by state governments as employers and places of public accommodation, unless the fact that constitutional claims of disability discrimination merit only rational basis
scrutiny from courts changes the Section 5 analysis.
B.

THE QUESTION OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW

Much ink has been spilled on the question whether the Court
in Cleburne in fact applied the rational basis standard, or whether
it subjected the ordinance at issue to some form of heightened
scrutiny under the guise of traditional rational basis review.235 For
the purposes of determining Congress's power to remedy and prevent discriminatory treatment of the disabled, however, the answer
to that puzzle is irrelevant. What matters is not the verbal formulation the Court applies when determining whether a given classification violates the Equal Protection Clause, but rather the constitutional norms that inform the various tests.236
The great bulk of legislation, both state and federal, classifies
235See, e.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 1612 (2d ed 1988) (describing Court's review in Cleburne as "covertly heightened scrutiny"); Philip P. Frickey, The
Fool on the Hill: CongressionalFindings, ConstitutionalAdjudication, and United States v. Lopez,
46 Case W L Rev 695, 726 (1996) (suggesting that Cleburne applied something "more
stringent than garden-variety" rational basis review); Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection,
Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky L J 591, 598
(1999) ("While Cleburne purported to apply rational basis review, both its explication and
application of the rational basis standard proved difficult to square with the sort of judicial
deference that the paradigm clearly requires."); David 0. Stewart, Supreme Court Report:
A Growing Equal Protection Clause? 17 ABA J 108, 112 (Oct 1995) (describing analysis in
Cleburne as "rational basis with teeth"). As one Justice noted at oral argument in Garrett:
Cleburne does-the result seems at odds with the-with just anything goes, which
had been what rational basis meant. I thought that the Cleburne decision was very
much like Reed v. Reed in the gender area. That is, the Court purported to apply
rational basis, but came to a result that didn't square with any prior rational basis
decision.
Oral Argument at 52, Univ. of Ala. v Garrett (No 99-1240) (statement of unidentified
Justice).
236In its brief to the Court in Garrett, the United States argued that it is counterintuitive
to limit Congress's Section 5 authority on the ground that the classification in question is
subject to rational basis review by the courts. See Brief for United States at 38, Garrett
(No 99-1240). Given that rational basis scrutiny is premised on the principle of judicial
restraint, see FCC v Beach Communications, 508 US 307, 315 (1993) (observing that rational
basis review "is a paradigm of judicial restraint"), it does seem odd to suggest that the fact
that a court will review a given classification under the rational basis standard should translate into a limitation on what Congress can do with regard to that same classification. As
we argue below, however, it does not follow that the fact that a certain classification is
subjected to rational basis scrutiny under Section 1 is wholly unrelated to the question of
the scope of Congress's enforcement authority under Section 5.
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individuals in some way.237 All those classifications conceivably
could be challenged on equal protection grounds, and most, if not
all, would be reviewed under the highly deferential rational basis
standard. This reflects, not only the "presumption of constitution23
ality" and corresponding principles of judicial restraint,

but,

more fundamentally, the notion that "the prohibition of the Equal
Protection Clause goes no further than ... invidious discrimina'
The Equal Protection Clause simply is not concerned
tion."239
about every type of classification (or about classifications as such),

24°
To take the
even those that rest on rather dubious rationales.

paradigmatic example of a classification subject to rational basis
review, Congress surely lacks authority under Section 5 to enact
regulations protecting opticians.24 ' We reach this conclusion, however, not because courts review laws that distinguish between opti-

cians and optometrists under the rational basis standard, but because of the typical reasons advanced for why such a classification
merit only the most deferential scrutiny.

The applicability of rational basis review generally is related to
the likelihood that the state has a legitimate reason for treating
otherwise similarly situated individuals or groups differently. From
an institutional perspective, it is entirely proper, indeed unavoidable, for courts to proceed on the assumption that the politically
accountable branches of government (both state and federal) generally act constitutionally and in good faith. 42 Even if it were possible for a court to determine what really motivated legislators
237See Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 631 (1996) ("The Fourteenth Amendment's promise
that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons.").
"I See note 208.
231Williamson v Lee Optical, 348 US 483, 489 (1955).
20 See, e.g., Romer, 517 US at 632 ("In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it
can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or
works tot he disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous.").
See also New Orleansv Dukes, 427 US 297 (1976) (holding that tourism benefits justified
classification favoring pushcart vendors of certain longevity); Williamson, 348 US at 48889 (rejecting equal protection challenge to regulation, based on assumed health concerns,
burdening opticians but not optometrists or ophthalmologists); Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v New York, 336 US 106 (1949) (holding that potential traffic hazards justified exemption
of vehicles advertising owner's products from general advertising bar).
241See Williamson, 348 US at 489.
242See, e.g., Mueller v Allen, 463 US 388, 394 (1983) (noting Court's "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives" to legislature).
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when they passed a certain law containing a classification harming
a particular group, it would be inappropriate for the judiciary customarily to second-guess the motivations of a coordinate branch
of government. Accordingly, rather than inquire, in each case,
whether the classification in question truly is based on rational,
legitimate considerations, the Court will assume the truth of any
explanations given, and will sustain the legislation if any plausible
rational objective can be advanced for it.
The Court departs from this deferential approach when it has
reason to be skeptical that legitimate objectives in fact inform the
legislation, because it harms "discrete and insular"2 43 minority
groups whose participation in the political process is hampered by
societal prejudice, or because the classification is such that it is
likely to reflect irrational prejudice, "negative attitudes," or
"vague, undifferentiated fears."' 44 Classifications based on race and
national origin, for example, are subjected to strict scrutiny not
because individuals in the identified groups have different, or
greater, rights under the Equal Protection Clause than do others,
but because laws targeting those groups are extraordinarily unlikely to admit of any rational justification: Factors such as race or
national origin "are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations
are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in
the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. 2 45
The state may, in theory, overcome the presumption that racebased classifications and the like are illegitimately motivated by
showing that such classifications are necessary to a compelling state
interest, but it is generally understood that the required showing
is almost impossible to make.
Other classifications, like those based on gender, call for a
heightened, but somewhat less stringent, standard of review.
Heightened scrutiny is appropriate because gender "generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment."' 46 However,
to the extent that men and women are, in fact, different, there
sometimes will be legitimate reasons for treating them differently.
243Carolene Prods. v United States, 304 US 144, 153 n 4 (1938).
144City

of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 US 432, 448-49 (1985).

241Id at 440 (emphasis added).
246 Id

at 440-41.
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Accordingly, while gender-based classifications are viewed with
disfavor, we recognize that they do not always "reflect outmoded
'
The
notions of the relative capabilities of men and women." 247
justification
of
burden
exacting
less
slightly
a
bears
therefore
state
when it differentiates between individuals on the basis of gender:
it must show that the gender-based classification is "substantially
'
related" to an "important governmental objective."248
Finally, some classifications-such as those based on age-are
far more likely than not to reflect legitimate legislative concerns.
are
As a result, the state need show only that such classifications
2 49
interest.
governmental
rationally related to a legitimate
It is important to recognize, however, that although rational basis review tends to reflect a judicial conclusion that the classification in question is unlikely to implicate concerns of constitutional
stature, this is not always the case. Indeed, Cleburne aptly illustrates
the prudential considerations that often drive the Court's application of the rational basis standard. The Court reasoned that disability discrimination should receive rational basis review by the
courts, not because persons with disabilities lack the traditional
indicia of a suspect class, but because heightened scrutiny would
unduly restrict legislative solutions: "How this large and diversified
group is to be treated under the law is a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified
professionals.""2 5 Thus, the Court's application of rational basis
141Id

at 441.

248Miss. Univ. for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 724 (1982); Wengler v Druggists Mut.

Ins. Co., 446 US 142, 150 (1980); Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 197 (1976).
249 See, e.g., Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 631 (1996) ("[]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long
as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end."); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v Murgia,
427 US 307, 314 (1976) (recognizing that legislative classifications are unavoidable, and
stating that "[plerfection in making the necessary classification is neither possible nor necessary," so legislation will be upheld so long as classification "rationally furthers the purposes
identified by the State"); Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485 (1970) (stating that legislation "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications [it
makes] are imperfect"). See also Cleburne, 473 US at 441-42 ("[W]here individuals in the
group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to the interests the State
has the authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant. . . to closely scrutinize
legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be
pursued.").
250 Cleburne, 473 US at 442-43. See also id at 443-45 (expressing concern that heightened
scrutiny of legislation singling out disabled for special treatment could dissuade legislators
from passing laws to benefit disabled).
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scrutiny in the disability discrimination context was explicitly tied
21
to Congress's ability independently to address the problem. 1
The probabilistic approach of the Court's tiered system of review-reflecting the recognition that some classifications are more
likely than others to fall within the scope of equal protection concern-can be transferred to the context of Congress's Section 5
authority. The idea is generally the same, but the burden of justification is inverted: When Congress legislates to protect a group
whose defining characteristics may, in some circumstances, merit
differential treatment, it must explain why federal legislation is
necessary in order to protect members of the group from the sort
of invidious discrimination the Constitution forbids. 2 Congress's
task, in other words, is to demonstrate that the injury it seeks to
prevent or remedy is one of constitutional concern.25 1 In the context of antidiscrimination legislation, this means, not that the
Court would conclude that classifications involving the group in
question should be subjected to heightened scrutiny, but that Congress has identified a problem that implicates constitutional values
the Court has recognized, such as the guarantee that no citizen
shall be subjected to "arbitrary and irrational ' 25 4 discrimination
based on "antipathy" or "prejudice. ' 25 5 Indeed, Congress's experience with regard to certain issues and its superior fact-finding ability will often enable it to identify, in a way courts cannot, instances
of governmental action that violate the constitutional principles
found in the Court's decisions.
The problem with the ADEA, the Kimel Court tells us, was that
Congress failed to make such a showing: It "never identified any
pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional viola-

"' See id at 439 (noting that rational basis scrutiny applies "absent controlling congressional direction"); id at 443-44 (citing with approval federal legislation prohibiting discrimination against mentally disabled individuals).
"' Conversely, when Congress acts on behalf of a racial minority, for example, whose
characteristics will seldom (if ever) be rationally related to a legitimate state interest so as
to justify differential treatment, its bears a lower burden of justification, because one doesn't
need extensive proof of unconstitutional discrimination to recognize that classifications
based on race implicate constitutional concerns.
253
See Part I.B.
4Cleburne, 473 US at 446.
255Id at 443.
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tion."'2 56 The ADA, by contrast, is premised on Congress's finding-based on extensive evidence from across the country-that
"our society is still infected by the ancient, now almost subconscious assumption that people with disabilities are less than fully
human and therefore not fully eligible for the opportunities, services, and support systems which are available to other people as
a matter of right." '57 The result, Congress concluded, "is massive,
society-wide discrimination." ' 58 The Court repeatedly has emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause is violated by differential
treatment founded on such "invidious, overbroad, and archaic stereotypes" about the relative ability of certain individuals or
groups.259 The object of the ADA, then, is a legitimate one: the
prevention and remediation of unconstitutional discrimination
against the disabled.26 °
C.

IS THE ADA "APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION"?

Having determined that the injury Congress sought to address
with the ADA implicates the equality-based values embodied in
the Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted by the Court, we must
now assess whether the means Congress adopted are "plainly
adapted" to the goal of remedying or preventing that injury.261
Does the ADA "tend[ ] ...to secure to all persons the enjoyment
of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the
laws"? 262
The ADA's substantive provisions, on the whole, reflect the con256

Kimel v Florida Bd.of Regents, 120 S Ct 631, 649 (2000).

257S Rep No 116, at 8-9.

Id.

258

259

J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. TB., 511 US 127, 130-31 (1994); United States v Virginia,
518 US 515, 553 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 725 (1982).
260The Court in Cleburne recognized that discrimination against the mentally disabled
could violate the Constitution: "Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be
instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in fact invidious, and that are properly subject to judicial correction under constitutional norms." Cleburne, 473 US at 446.
261McCullocb v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 315, 421 (1819).
262Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US 339, 345-46 (1879). As discussed above, the congruence
and proportionality test is inapposite where, as here, it is clear from the legislative record
that "the object of [the legislation in question is] the carefully delimited remediation or
prevention of constitutional violations." Fla. PrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd.v College
Savings Bank, 527 US 627, 647 (1999). See notes 100-104 and accompanying text; Part
II.B.
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siderations that inform the Court's tiered system of review. The
Act's principal provisions target only unreasonable discrimination,
namely, discrimination in circumstances in which the government's interest in excluding an individual from a certain job or
program "by reason of such disability" is minimal at most and is
unlikely to bear a rational relationship to some legitimate interest.263 Under the ADA, the states may exclude disabled individuals
from employment, programs, services, or benefits for any lawful
reason unrelated to their disability (after due consideration of the
ameliorating effects of reasonable accommodation). Moreover, the
ADA permits disqualification of a disabled individual if she is unable to perform "the essential functions" of the employment position," or "meet[] the essential eligibility requirements" of the
governmental program or service.265 Thus, the ADA's core prohibition of discrimination applies only in those circumstances in
which it is unlikely that differential treatment of the disabled can
be justified by reference to valid, rational considerations.
Any debate over the ADA likely will center upon the Act's authorization of disparate impact challenges and its requirement of
"reasonable accommodation" in employment266 and "reasonable
modification" in public services,2 67 as these rules are not required
by the Equal Protection Clause.268 This is, in large part, a red herring. The Court repeatedly-and recently-has stated that Congress is not limited to prohibiting conduct the Constitution forbids
of its own force.269 Certainly, had Congress garnered little or no
evidence of ongoing governmental discrimination against the disabled, it might be appropriate to inquire into the reach of the ADA
to determine whether it is likely to achieve a legitimate end, or
whether some unacceptable proportion of the conduct it prohibits
falls outside the reach of constitutional protections. But such an
inquiry is both inappropriate and unnecessary where Congress has
USC § 12132.
§ 12111(8).
265
Id § 12131(2).
2
-6Id
§§ 12111(8), 12111(b)
26342

2-4Id

(5)(A).
Id § 12131(2).
26' This is, for example, the position taken by the petitioners in Garrett. Brief for Petitioners at 29-30, 42-44, Garrett (No 99-1240).
269 See note 9.
267
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found, based on the substantial evidence before it, that the disabled
have been subject to continuing unconstitutional discrimination.
In such cases, the proper question is whether Congress reasonably
could have concluded that broad prophylactic legislation was
needed to root out instances of discrimination that might escape
judicial attention, and to secure for the disabled full practical enjoyment of the constitutional guarantee of equality.
It seems clear that the ADA satisfies this deferential standard.
Given the nature of disability, to treat the disabled in precisely the
same way one would treat other citizens will often result in practical inequality.27 ° Similarly, in light of the history of widespread
discrimination against the disabled,271 to merely forbid future constitutional violations may accomplish little in the sense of guaranteeing disabled citizens the full equality the Constitution promises.
Thus, by targeting governmental practices with discriminatory impact, Congress has attempted to eliminate the "built in head'
faced by disabled individuals, as well as to smoke out
winds"272
discriminatory treatment that may be based on "subconscious ste'
Indeed, it is through crafting legislareotypes and prejudices."273
tive solutions that go beyond the minimum requirements of the
Constitution in order to ensure practical enjoyment of constitutional guarantees that Congress fulfills its role within the institutional division of labor envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Admittedly, the ADA's disparate impact and reasonable accommodation requirements will apply to some state employers who
have no previous history of discrimination. But that does not gainsay the useful preventative role such requirements play in promoting general adherence on the part of covered employers and public
accommodations to legislation that seeks to promote the integration of groups previously excluded from employment and other
mainstream activities because of their disability. Whether Congress could have legislated in a narrower fashion, or should have
been more receptive to compliance costs in imposing these re270A similar argument was raised by amici in Garrett,who noted that, "[giving a person
who is mobility-impaired an equal right to vote or be a juror, without concomitant changes
in polling places or courtrooms, will accomplish nothing practical." Brief for Amici Curiae
Law Professors at 25, Garrett (No 99-1240).
271See Part III.A (discussing congressional findings of discrimination against disabled).
272Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 US 424, 432 (1971).
273Watson v Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 US 977, 990 (1988).
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quirements-these are questions of legislative design and policy.
Under McCulloch, and the principle of deferential review accorded
actions of a coordinate branch of government that it stands for,
they do not place in question whether ADA is an "appropriate"
exercise of Section 5 authority.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This article is, first and foremost, a call to demystify the
Section 5 power of Congress. Correctly understood, Section 5 enactments raise no issue of separation of powers. The infirmity of
the statute struck down in Boerne was not due to its provenance
in Section 5. Rather, the statute sought directly to enlist the judiciary in implementing a congressional substitute for the equal protection analysis the courts ordinarily would perform; in effect,
Congress was commandeering the courts to do its bidding in the
course of engaging in constitutional adjudication. Boerne involved
an unusual statute. Unlike RFRA, Section 5 legislation generally
should be understood as providing supplemental protection of
groups, supplemental regulation of conduct that implicate no separation of powers concerns. Thus, while Congress unquestionably
exercises substantive authority under Section 5, it enjoys no definitional authority over the Constitution's meaning.
Section 5 enactments do raise federalism concerns, and the
Court properly should inquire whether the ends of the legislation
can be said plausibly to "enforce" the self-operative provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment. But enforcement authority is not limited to codifying, or providing additional sanctions, for conduct
that courts on their own would find unconstitutional. Congress
enjoys a remedial authority to act in a prophylactic fashion to prevent violations ever from occurring; to establish an environment
conducive to the practical enjoyment of equal protection and due
process of the laws. On the issue of permissible ends of Section 5
legislation, the question ordinarily should be whether Congress has
acted in an area that the Court has identified (or will agree) is one
warranting heightened constitutional concern. Classifications that
the Court has subjected to intermediate or strict scrutiny are such
areas, while classifications that are held to merit only rational basis
scrutiny generally are not. However, classifications in the latter
category may be proper subjects of Section 5 legislation when they
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are found to implicate the constitutional values that inhere in the
Equal Protection Clause.
The Court's congruence and proportionality test plays a useful
role in cases, like Kimel, where despite the invocation of Section
5, the absence of findings and the size of the gap between what
the statute requires and what the Fourteenth Amendment requires
of its own force raise the question whether Congress was, in fact,
animated by Fourteenth Amendment concerns in passing the law.
The test is unnecessary in cases like Boerne; it is inappropriate in
cases like Morrison, for it results in a judicial scrutiny of the means
Congress has chosen to advance an otherwise legitimate Section
5 objective.
On one level, we should welcome the renewed attention to Congress's Section 5 authority, for an appropriate set of ground rules
can serve both to quiet legitimate concerns that Congress impermissibly will overtake state functions and to initiate a new era of
candor in legislation, encouraging Congress to legislate in the service of equality and due process norms under Section 5 rather than
under the guise of regulation of commercial activity under the
Commerce Clause. Morrison gives pause, however, and presents a
threat to the capacity of the national legislature to address national
problems through national solutions.

